This is right, and similar to what a previous poster put on here. It broke through on great volume, not testing support on low volume. This is what longs want to see. It's a pain, but not out of the ordinary for it to test.
Sentiment: Strong Buy
Indeed, they do not know about this company, what it does, and where it is going. Most hold for a quick scalp and sell before the end of the day, which is fine for the quick and small profits. However, they stand a good chance of missing a big gain.
The U.S. could suffer a coast-to-coast blackout if saboteurs knocked out just nine of the country's 55,000 electric-transmission substations on a scorching summer day, according to a previously unreported federal analysis.
The study by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission concluded that coordinated attacks in each of the nation's three separate electric systems could cause the entire power network to collapse, people familiar with the research said.
A small number of the country's substations play an outsize role in keeping power flowing across large regions. The FERC analysis indicates that knocking out nine of those key substations could plunge the country into darkness for weeks, if not months.
"This would be an event of unprecedented proportions," said Ross Baldick, a professor of electrical engineering at the University of Texas at Austin.
No federal rules require utilities to protect vital substations except those at nuclear power plants. Regulators recently said they would consider imposing security standards.
FERC last year used software to model the electric system's performance under the stress of losing important substations. The substations use large power transformers to boost the voltage of electricity so it can move long distances and then to reduce the voltage to a usable level as the electricity nears homes and businesses.
The agency's so-called power-flow analysis found that different sets of nine big substations produced similar results. The Wall Street Journal isn't publishing the list of 30 critical substations studied by FERC. The commission declined to discuss the analysis or to release its contents.
Some federal officials said the conclusions might overstate the grid's vulnerability.
Electric systems are designed to be resilient and it would be difficult for attackers to disable many locations, said David Ortiz, an Energy Department deputy assistant secretary who was briefed on the FERC study. The agency's findings nevertheless had value "as a way of starting a conversation on physical security," he said.
The study's results have been known for months by people at federal agencies, Congress and the White House, who were briefed by then-FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff and others at the commission. As reported by the Journal last month, Mr. Wellinghoff was concerned about a shooting attack on a California substation last April, which he said could be a dress rehearsal for additional assaults.
"There are probably less than 100 critical high voltage substations on our grid in this country that need to be protected from a physical attack," he said by email this week. "It is neither a monumental task, nor is it an inordinate sum of money that would be required to do so." Mr. Wellinghoff left FERC in November and is a partner at law firm Stoel Rives LLP in San Francisco.
FERC has given the industry until early June to propose new standards for the security of critical facilities, such as substations.
Executives at several big utilities declined to discuss the risks to substations but said they are increasing spending on security. Virginia-based Dominion Resources Inc., for example, said it planned to spend $300 million to $500 million within seven years to harden its facilities.
A memo prepared at FERC in late June for Mr. Wellinghoff before he briefed senior officials made several urgent points. "Destroy nine interconnection substations and a transformer manufacturer and the entire United States grid would be down for at least 18 months, probably longer," said the memo, which was reviewed by the Journal. That lengthy outage is possible for several reasons, including that only a handful of U.S. factories build transformers.
The California attack "demonstrates that it does not require sophistication to do significant damage to the U.S. grid," according to the memo, which was written by Leonard Tao, FERC's director of external affairs. Mr. Tao said his function was to help Mr. Wellinghoff simplify his report on the analysis.
The memo reflected a belief by some people at the agency that an attack-related blackout could be extraordinarily long, in part because big transformers and other equipment are hard to replace. Also, each of the three regional electric systems—the West, the East and Texas—have limited interconnections, making it hard for them to help each other in an emergency.
Some experts said other simulations that are widely used in the electricity industry produced similar results as the FERC analysis.
"This study used a relatively simplified model, but other models come to the same conclusion," said A.P. "Sakis" Meliopoulos, professor of electrical and computer engineering at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta. He estimated it would take "a slightly larger number" of substation attacks to cause a U.S.-wide blackout.
In its modeling, FERC studied what would happen if various combinations of substations were crippled in the three electrical systems that serve the contiguous U.S. The agency concluded the systems could go dark if as few as nine locations were knocked out: four in the East, three the West and two in Texas, people with knowledge of the analysis said.
The actual number of locations that would have to be knocked out to spawn a massive blackout would vary depending on available generation resources, energy demand, which is highest on hot days, and other factors, experts said. Because it is difficult to build new transmission routes, existing big substations are becoming more crucial to handling electricity.
In last April's attack at PG&E Corp.'s Metcalf substation, gunmen shot 17 large transformers over 19 minutes before fleeing in advance of police. The state grid operator was able to avoid any blackouts.
The Metcalf substation sits near a freeway outside San Jose, Calif. Some experts worry that substations farther from cities could face longer attacks because of their distance from police. Many sites aren't staffed and are protected by little more than chain-link fences and cameras.
While the prospect of a nationwide blackout because of sabotage might seem remote, small equipment failures have led to widespread power outages. In September 2011, for example, a failed transmission line in Arizona set off a chain reaction that created an outage affecting millions of people in the state and Southern California.
Sabotage could wreak worse havoc, experts said.
"The power grid, built over many decades in a benign environment, now faces a range of threats it was never designed to survive," said Paul Stockton, a former assistant secretary of defense and president of risk-assessment firm Cloud Peak Analytics. "That's got to be the focus going forward."
WASHINGTON — Nearly all the utilities that participated in two-day exercise last November to test the preparedness of the power grid for online and physical attacks said that their planning was not good enough, according to a report by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, which organized the drill.
But the participants, more than 2,000 of them from across the United States, Canada and Mexico, said the exercise taught them lessons about whom they would need to communicate with in an attack, and where their vulnerabilities were.
The report had few details, because organizers said they did not want to provide a road map about the shortcomings and because they had promised to limit the scope of their evaluation to induce utilities to participate. But the reliability group is communicating with the utilities individually about their performances.
The drill provided “a one-two punch between cyber and physical security avenues,” said Bill Lawrence, manager of critical infrastructure protection awareness at the electric reliability corporation, which is charged by the government with enforcing standards of conduct on the grid.
It also uncovered more ordinary problems. For example, planners stress conference calls to keep all participants informed about attacks on their neighbors, but the conference system did not have enough telephone lines.
In the drill, participants spent a morning simulating 12 hours of attacks, then completed another 12 hours in the afternoon. On the second day, industry executives and government officials conducted a “tabletop exercise” to explore when the federal government might step in during a coordinated attack.
The drill was called Gridex II, short for Grid Exercise. It was more than twice the size of the first one two years ago and participation exceeded the organizers’ expectations, reflecting wider anxiety about the grid as a vulnerable national asset. Another exercise is planned for 2015.
In the months since the drill, a report of an attack on a substation in California has raised more concern about vulnerability. Subsequent investigation by the police cast doubt on the idea that the attack was the work of more than one person with insider knowledge. But the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission has told the utilities to prepare reports about their vulnerabilities.
One issue is the security of the reports themselves, which would be a guide for an attacker.
The president of the reliability group, Gerry Cauley, said that establishing protection against attacks would have to be fit into context. Utilities are hardening their systems against big storms like Hurricane Sandy, he said, and are working on determining their vulnerability to solar activity that changes the earth’s magnetic field.
“We have to keep this always in perspective,” he said. The question was “getting the bang from the buck” spent on behalf of electricity customers for protection and resiliency. “We have to be always conscious of that balance,” he said.
Among the findings after the drill were that the utility system needed better access to additional transformers, which are large, hard to move and require long lead times for procurement. The California attack was on transformers. Also, utilities and law enforcement personnel need to “develop mechanisms to preserve evidence and collect forensic data following a suspected physical or cyberattack,” all while trying to get the lights back on. In the drill, emergency medical workers at the scene of a hypothetical attack were sometimes fired upon by the attackers.
The public report did not detail what the utilities said they had found lacking in their own planning. But it said that more than 98 percent found the exercise “useful for identifying opportunities to enhance their cyberincident response plans,” and 92 percent said the same for physical incident response plans.
I'll be happy if it does, because I will add to my position.
fdkp, you're "brilliant" with your Monday Morning Quarterback analysis.
It recently poked through 50 DMA and 200 DMA, plus had golden cross. This is the real positive. The short-term frustration is it loves to then test from above, which is what is happening now. Another thing is some big money has been buying big chunks once in a while. The teeny day traders jump on, then panic and sell when it doesn't keep on the next few days. We will soon have a sustained rally once clarity is given.
I think big things are going to happen. What usually happens is you start to think "next time it has a big up day I'll sell and buy back cheaper", only by the time you think that the next time it goes up, and keeps going without you.
Daytraders and scalpers don't have the cash to hold non-marginable stocks. Instead they like to play musical chairs with stocks like FCEL, BLDP, PLUG, and looks like they're running CPST today. The difference between those stocks and GV? None of them make money-but GV does! Its a zero-game of musical chairs but no one admits when they get stuck holding the bag. An analyst yesterday stated one of the 11 dollar high-flyers was worth 50 cents, and it dropped like an anvil. Gamblers play those stocks. Smart money like Boston Avenue Capital own GV. You've been knocking this stock for as long as I've been reading this message board. Please tell me you're not stupid enough to short this, rofl.
Sentiment: Strong Buy
Absolutely! Especially since C&C will not be part of Q4, unless they do Pro-Forma. As previously mentioned, $20 million + rev.; EPS of $.08 - $.10; Backlog of $30 million+ and I think you're off to the races.
This is no small feat when you consider that the power grid is aging while also expected to integrate new technologies—intermittent and distributed renewable energy supplies in particular—that it was not designed to handle.
Smart grid technology can help ensure that the central grid can meet these demands and deliver the service that customers—even those with their own onsite generation—will expect. We’ve written extensively about how self-healing smart grid solutions can dramatically increase power reliability. Energy storage can also provide a back-up power supply in the event the preferred source is lost or unable to fully meet demand. These types of technologies are especially important to protect power reliability in the face of inclement weather, which can wreak havoc with power systems.
Investments in advanced technologies that increase grid reliability will offer benefits that will be valued by all electricity customers, regardless of whether they use grid-based services as a primary or alternate source of electricity. In the face of uncertainty about how the utility business will evolve, improvements to power reliability certainly merit focus.
About Mike Edmonds
Mike Edmonds is the Vice President of the U.S. Business Unit for S&C. In this position, Edmond’s primary responsibility is for business development, operating profit, customer support and sales growth within the U.S. Prior to joining S&C in April 2010 Edmonds was Vice President & General Manager of Siemens USA Energy Automation group, responsible for the real-time solutions business for energy management systems, market systems, substation automation and protection control. Edmonds’ previous roles include VP & GM for PTI, whose products and services serve 130 countries in system planning including early adoption and endorsement of the common information model (CIM).
The traditional utility business model faces great upheaval, as I discussed in a recent blog entry. Adoption of distributed generation—and distributed solar generation in particular—threatens to make a significant dent in utility revenues as more customers use onsite generation as their preferred source of electricity. Utilities are considering what role the central power system can, or should, play in light of increased use of more distributed energy resources. What type of grid-based services can they offer, and what benefits would such services provide to utility customers?
Even for businesses and consumers who use distributed power, I have a hard time envisioning that many will want to cut the cord entirely from the central power system. As I wrote previously, Mrs. Edmonds will not allow that even if I wanted to! Many will want to be able to sell excess power generated by their solar panels, for one. But just as important, most customers will still want to have the utility source as a back-up supply in case onsite electricity generation fails or is insufficient to meet demand. Power outages cost billions of dollars a year, and electricity customers won’t want to sacrifice power reliability as they transition to using distributed sources of electricity. Distributed renewable energy resources, however, can’t promise to meet demand 24/7 due to the intermittent nature of sunshine and the wind. There is also the risk that distributed generation equipment, like solar panels, could be damaged in major weather events and cause an extended loss of onsite electricity supplies. This is where the central power grid comes into play.
As an alternate or back-up source of electricity for many customers, expectations for reliable electric service will only grow. Anyone paying for a back-up power supply is going to expect that this back-up supply will be there when they need it, so there will be an imperative to further boost grid reliability levels. This is no small feat when