Impossible to go by LATS due to Parsons' own ruling
For the reasons previously stated, PharmAthene is not entitled to a form of relief
that would interfere with SIGA’s control of ST-246 or the patents related to it.
PharmAthene could have proceeded from the LATS to conclude a definitivelicense agreement with SIGA in early 2006 or it could have held fast to its original
suggestion in February 2006 that a complete license agreement be incorporated as
an exhibit to the merger term sheet and later related agreements. In fact,
PharmAthene did neither nor did they otherwise secure the right to insist that the
terms of the LATS be strictly adhered to in an ultimate license agreement. As a
result, I have concluded that PharmAthene is not entitled to a license to ST-246
and the patents related to it.
The Supreme Court of Delaware's decision that the LATS agreement should be considered a "binding" contractual agreement basically implies that both companies will have the right to produce and distribute the drug, and SIGA will receive licensing revenue from PIP.
PIP will now have worldwide production and distribution rights to the drug for the indefinite future, rather than just 10 years (in the original opinion by Parsons). PIP will receive 88-90 percent of all sales of the drug. SIGA will still own the rights to the drug, but must, by enforceable contract, license the drug according to the LATS terms to PIP.
PIP already has the production capability to produce 200-300 million doses of a drug per year. With worldwide rights to produce and distribute the drug, and with the required assistance of SIGA, SIGA will solve its production issues (i.e. its ability to produce the drug in very large quantities for worldwide distribution), cost savings will be realized due to scaling, and the FDA will more likely approve the greater ability to fulfill demand for the drug should the need arise for global distribution.
toobig, no the court held there was a breach and that it was not clear upon which theory the lower court determined damages but that could not use estoppel or equitable principles but only expectation damages IF damages were not speculative under contract principles. Parsons already said in his lower opinion that damages under expectation damages were too speculative.