Although your comment is valid this is not a new issue. I wrote about it in June of 2012, saying that:
"One of these challenges were the company's Board of Directors' liberal spraying of incentive options on the staff and management in general (I noted that "issuing close to one million options per year is obscene when the number of outstanding shares is in the 25 to 50 million range,") impossing great dilution on the common shareholders over the last years, and, in particular, the consistent issuing of options to the company's CEO, Mr. BenBassat (to the tune of 100,000 to 150,000 options per year,) which, effectively, had caused the CEO to suffer no dilution from the continued issuance of incentive options to the other parts of the company's staff and management. Moreover, given the CEO's direct and indirect holdings, then, frankly, in my view, he does not need any more incentive options, and, in fact, the issuance of more incentive options, through their anti-dilutive effect, are effectively - in a perverse way - not incenting the CEO to increase the shareholder value (if the CEO's holdings had been diluted at the same pace as that of the the common shareholders, the CEO would have a powerful incentive for increasing the valuation of the company.)
This is a very important issue because it 1) has managed to effectively, on an EPS basis, nullify much of the results achieved over the last years, 2) looks bad, and 3) discourages institutional shareholders from taking positions in the company. "
Frankly, and, yes, I know Fujugrower and the company's Board of Directors disagree with me, I don't think a large pool of options is warranted at this stage in the company's life-cycle. The risk to the employees is virtually zero; the salaries are at or above the norm, I assume; and an liquidity event is virtually assured.