Judge Robinson will be sanctioning Rambus in her ruling on 1/26 for spoliation of evidence.
Please read for yourself, don't let the RMBS pumper cheerleader squad mislead you as they have misled so many others in the past.
The first PDF linked on this page is the CAFC opinion for Micron v. Rambus:
The higher court remanded the decision only for clarification regarding what evidence on record should be used in determining bad faith spoliation. If Rambus is found by HJR to have plotted to destroy evidence in order to cripple the defense of those they sued, as the evidence discovered by piercing the attorney-client priveledge proves, then this is will in fact justify her original ruling that Rambus's patents are unenforceable.
Honorable Judge Whyte will be required to re-consider collateral estoppel after she has ruled.
Here is the link to Ken Nissly's brief to HJW, where he points out that HJW has been instructed to follow HJR's lead.
Quote: "Those considerations also provide compelling reasons for the Delaware remand to proceed first. The Federal Circuit “affirmed the [Delaware] district court’s determination of spoliation” ( Hynix II , 645 F.2d at 1344) and vacated this Court’s “Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in connection with the rejection of Hynix’s motion to dismiss on the basis of spoliation” due to“legal error” (id. at 1347). As Judge Robinson has noted, “in large measure, [her] work is done…” See Ex. C. to Hynix’s 9/30/11 brief at 9:19. This Court, by contrast, must consider the spoliation issues anew under the framework set forth in Micron II. In addition, the Federal Circuit left open the issue of collateral estoppel (see Hynix II, 645 F.2d at 1347 n.2), making it appropriate for this court to await the Delaware decision in order to give full consideration to the role of collateral estoppel in advancing the goal of consistent outcomes."
This POS is sure to sell off today, nobody wants to be all in when HJR rules from the bench tomorrow, way too risky.
I will be adding to my short position this morning, the afternoon is sure to be chaos.
I tried to add to my short position after closing out my ARMH short (temporarily), and I could not.
There are exact 0 shares available for shorting through Fidelity.com, hahaha. That means the shorts have piled on folks, get ready for a real bumpy ride tomorrow.
Overruled! LOL, you need a history lesson freakazoid. HJR's ruling was upheld by the higher court (CAFC) and HJW's was vacated.
The CAFC stated that evidence on record could prove bad faith and prejudice, but that this is not their job to interpret the evidence, and so they sent the case back for her to justify her ruling.
She will not be overruled, you are in for a rude awakening just like the other idiot pumpers on this board, and the RMBS IV forum.
I think you meant "baked in", regardless you are WRONG.. hahaha.
There are absolutely 0 news agencies reporting on this, and really thre aren't any analysts who cover RMBS anymore since they lost the AT case.
The only place investors would even hear about this case is from this forum, or the RMBS forum at investor village.
Nothing is baked in, except last quarters earnings which were pre-announced.
Nothing positive will come out of HJR's court for RMBS, earnings were pre-announced and so baked in, and any forward outlook will be overshadowed by HJR's court room news since this is happening on the same day as earnings.
The CAFC opinion on Micron II is 100% relevant, you ignorant pup.
HJR will rule on 1/26/12 on remand from this case...
My comprehension level is just fine, yours is questionable.
Judge Whyte also said spoliation didn't happen too, it's just too bad for Ramboids in fantasy land because we all know how that ruling was vacated!
Rambus acted in bad faith, HJR already ruled along these lines. The CAFC was clear that bad faith can be determined based on evidence, and that HJR should be precise about what evidence proves this.
You are in for a very rude awakening 16 bit bus, again.
Here's Rambus to Judge Whyte in their
brief before December the Dec 16 hearing:
<<It (Hynix) now reverts to its position that a less culpable mental state suffices on the basis of Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). But this Court itself
cited Precision Instrument in support of its bad faith standard, see Hynix I, 591 F. Supp. 2d at
1060 , and the decision states clearly that unclean hands requires “inequitableness or bad faith
relative to the matter in which [the plaintiff] seeks relief,” Precision Instrument, 324 U.S. at 814.
The other case that Hynix cites, Pfizer Inc. v. Int’l Rectifier Corp., 685 F.2d 357 (9th Cir. 1982),
is off the mark for many reasons. That case involved the application of unclean hands to
purportedly fraudulent dealings with the PTO—viz., the defendant interposed the inequitable
conduct species of unclean hands. Id. at 359. The Ninth Circuit therefore drew its standard of
“wrongfulness, willfulness, bad faith, or gross negligence” from a Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals decision on inequitable conduct. Id. (citing Carpet Seaming Tape Licensing Corp. v.
Best Seam Inc., 616 F.2d 1133, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1980), which in turn, cited Norton v. Curtiss,
433 F.2d 779, 795-96 (C.C.P.A. 1970) for the proposition that “gross negligence could suffice as
a sufficiently culpable state of mind”). Needless to say, that standard is no longer good law after
Therasense, which “tighten[ed] the standards for finding both intent and materiality.” 649 F.3d at
1290. Its requirement of “deliberately planned and carefully executed schemes to defraud” is not
only the same standard applied by this court, but also the same standard applied in more recent
Ninth Circuit authorities on unclean hands. What is more, in evaluating the unclean hands theory
before it, the Pfizer Court itself applied a standard that is much closer to bad faith than its broad
language suggests. Specifically, it held that the defendants “failed to show by clear and
convincing evidence that Pfizer misrepresented or concealed prior art, facts or information.” 685
F.2d at 359 (emphasis added). >>
Here's the CAFC:
<<<< The district court must “select the least onerous sanction corresponding to the willfulness of the destructive act and the prejudice suffered by the victim.” Schmid, 13 F.3d at 79 (citing Jamie S. Gorelick, Steven Marzen and Lawrence Solum, Destruction of Evidence, § 3.16, p. 117 (1989)). While the district court noted that “[s]anctions such as adverse jury instructions and preclusion of evi-dence are impractical, bordering on meaningless, under these circumstances and in the context of a typical jury trial,” and that “the simple imposition of fees and costs is wholly inadequate under the facts of this case,” Decision, 255 F.R.D. at 151, it did not explain why only dismissal would “vindicate the trifold aims of: (1) deterring future spoliation of evidence; (2) protecting the defendants’ interests; and (3) remedying the prejudice defendants suffered as a result of [Rambus’s] actions.” See West, 167 F.3d at 180.
If the district court again concludes on remand that there was bad faith and prejudice, the record evidence may indeed justify a dispositive sanction, but the serious-ness of such a sanction warrants an analysis of all of the factors discussed above. Cf. Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (noting that because “inherent powers are shielded from direct democratic controls,” they “must be exercised with restraint and discretion”). >>
Therefore, there is a BIG difference between negligent spoliation AND bad faith spoliation!
Moreover, even if it was done in bad faith, where's the prejudice?
And even if there was prejudice AND two judges currently presiding over these issues (Judge Whyte & Essex)
have already said there wasn't AND than half the judges over a decade worth of litigation said it was NOT done in bad faith (Judge Timony, Judge Whyte and Judge McGuire) how do we even get to a remedy that's anything more than the least onerous one??