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Netflix, Inc. Message Board

  • singhlion2001 singhlion2001 Dec 26, 2012 1:55 PM Flag

    REVISIT 2010/2011 FRAUD LOOT SCRIPTED PLAY BOOK BY CRIMINAL REED HASTINGS AND HIS SCAM GANG

    ((((Taking all of the profit from the Company for himself and fraud street crime loot partners leaving an empty shell for Stockholders.))))
    RED ALERT IN USA:
    BIGGEST SCAM LOOT IN BILLIONS BY MF CRIMINAL REED HASTINGS @NETFLIX LOOT CONTINUES
    Netflix insider enrich Ponzi scam is too deep and Billions have been looted.This company since listed on exchange has been playing scam with managing cook books to enrich insiders and their criminal wall street partners at Goldman Sachs,Morgan Stanley and insider Technology Cross ventures.

    I challenge every Financial expert in USA to debate this on TV.Dotcom scam planned end of 2009 and executed in 2010 with streaming scam hype and $350M debt money used for short squeeze scam bubble and balance sheet raped and now worthless. Off balance sheet liabilities over Billion. How can insider take over $1B+ in 2010 alone , when company earned only $160M in 2010?
    ---------------------------
    CRIMINAL THUG REED HASTINGS AND HIS FRAUD STREET CRIME PARTNERS
    MORGAN STANLEY & GOLDMAN SACHS DUMPED MAJORITY OF THEIR SHARES FOR THE LOOT IN BILLIONS WITH SCAM BUBBLE CREATION AND MANIPULATION NOW WITH WEEKLY DERIVATIVES IS CRYSTAL CLEAR CRIME SCENE

    ASK SEC CRIMINAL WATCH DOGS AT SEC:
    WHAT IS PRICE/VOLUME MANIPULATION CRIME?
    WHAT IS PUMP/DUMP SCAM
    WHAT IS INSIDER TRADING AND MISLEADING SCAM SPIN AND RUMOR PUMP/DUMP NEWS SPINS?

    More proof: White Collar crime Data

    White-collar crimes cost the United States more than $300 billion annually according to the FBI.



    NETFLIX DAY LIGHT ROBBERY CONTINUES=PROVES SEC/FINRA CRIMINAL WATCH DOGS IN THEIR POCKETS
    ------------
    This is what I see from Criminal Greedy #$%$ CEO DNA @NETFLIX=Biggest Ponzi scam since MADOFF
    ------------------------------ ---
    HERE IS LOOT IN BILLIONS WITH $200m DEBT SCAM BUBBLE AND BALANCE SHEET RAPED TO ZIPPO BY CRIMINAL THUG REED HASTINGS AND HIS FRAUD STREET GANG


    CRIMINAL CEO'S LIKE REED HASTINGS DO THIS:

    When I play Railroad Tycoon III, I often send my company deep into debt to get cash on hand to buy back shares, effectively increasing my ownership of the company as an absolute percentage. Then I issue massive DILUTION WITH FREE OPTION GRANT PRINTING PRESS or DIVIDENDS s until my company goes bankrupt, and start a new company.

    It's a way to shuttle money borrowed against a company's assets into my personal bank account at no risk to me........become a BILLIONAIRE IN FEW YEARS


    3. To Benefit Executives
    Many executives get the bulk of their compensation in the form of stock options. As a result, buybacks can serve a goal: as stock options are exercised, buyback programs absorb the excess stock and offset the dilution of existing share values and any potential reduction in earnings per share.

    By mopping up extra stock and keeping EPS up, buybacks is a convenient way for executives to maximize their own wealth. It's a way for them to maintain the value of the shares and share options. Some executives may even be tempted to pursue share buybacks to boost the share price in the short term and then sell their shares. What's more, the big bonuses that CEOs get are often linked to share price gains and increased earnings per share, so they have an incentive to pursue buybacks even when there are better ways to spend the cash or when the shares are overvalued. (Learn more in the Pages From The Bad CEO Playbook.)

    Pages From The Bad CEO Playbook
    http://www.investopedia.com/ articles/stocks/08/costs-bad- ceo.asp

    Hastings Behavior Review
    I thought it necessary to once again rehash Hastings record of behavior that seems to be un noticed in the media and investment community.....

    1) Colluded with WMT to conspire to corner DVD market that has resulted in a pending class action suit.

    2) Hired actors at Canadian streaming launch to pose as enthusiastic fans of streaming.

    3) Borrowed $200M in debt to buy back stock only to facilitate insiders and himself to sell their stock.

    4) This is my opinion. Has over stated & mislead investors on the extent NFLX has streaming subs by portraying stats that 60% of subs stream 15 min or more rather than disclose paying streaming subs. The motivation here is grant NFLX a higher P/E than its peers like CSTR.

    more......breakem1

    WHAT IS PRICE/VOLUME MANIPULATION CRIME?

    WHO OWNS NETFLIX SCAM BUBBLE SHARES?
    WHO IS LENDING SHORT SHARES?
    WHO IS PLAYING MANIPULATION SQUEEZE SCAM?
    WHO IS WRITING FRAUD RESEARCH REPORTS AND WHO BENEFITS FROM THESE SCAM SEARCH REPORTS?

    WHO LEND $200M DEBT TO READ HASTINGS AND FOR WHAT PURPOSE?
    WHY DID 5 BOARD OF DIRECTORS ALLOWED SUCH A SCAM BUY BACK WITH $200M DEBT?
    WHO MANAGED COOK BOOK SHARE COUNT FOR SCAM EARNINGS HYPE SCAM NUMBERS?

    WHO PLANNED ALL SCAM NEWS SPINS FOR PUMPING SCAM BUBBLE?

    LET THE JUSTICE BE SERVED IN USA

    HELLO SEC/FINRA CRIMINAL WATCH DOGS

    Sentiment: Strong Sell

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    • C. The Individual Defendants
      21. Defendant Reed Hastings (“Hastings”) has served as Netflix’s Chief
      Executive Officer since September 1998 and as its Co-Founder and Chairman of
      the Board since the Company’s inception. Hastings signed and certified Netflix’s
      false and misleading Form 10-K for fiscal 2010, as well as its false and misleading
      Forms 10-Q for the quarterly periods ending September 30, 2010, March 31, 2011
      and June 30, 2011. Hastings also made false and misleading statements on Netflix
      Earnings Conference Calls (“Earnings Calls”) on October 20, 2010 and January 26,
      2011 and during a December 8, 2010 Barclays Capital Global Technology
      Conference (the “Barclays Conference”). Further, Hastings made false and
      misleading statements in a December 20, 2010 article appearing in an online blog,
      Seeking Alpha. Hastings fraudulently knew that these statements were materially
      false and misleading at the time they were made.
      22. Hastings sold more than 187,432 shares of Netflix stock during the
      Class Period, reaping gross proceeds in excess of $43 million.
      23. Defendant David Wells (“Wells”) has served as Netflix’s Chief
      Financial Officer since December 2010 and its Vice President of Financial
      Planning & Analysis from August 2008 to December 2010. He held the position
      of Director of Operations Planning & Analysis from March 2004 to August 2008.
      Wells signed and certified Netflix’s false and misleading Form 10-K for fiscal
      2010, as well as its false and misleading Forms 10-Q for the quarterly periods
      ending March 31, 2011 and June 30, 2011. In addition, Wells signed Netflix’s
      materially false and misleading Forms 8-K dated January 26, 2011, April 25, 2011,
      July 25, 2011, September 15, 2011 and October 24, 2011, and publicly-filed letters 9

      CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 3:12-CV-00225-SC
      to the SEC dated May 20, 2011 and July 11, 2011. Wells fraudulently knew that
      these statements were materially false and misleading at the time they were made.
      24. Wells sold more than 6,100 shares of Netflix common stock during
      the Class Period, reaping gross proceeds in excess of $1.5 million.
      25. Defendant Barry McCarthy (“McCarthy”) served as the Chief
      Financial Officer of Netflix from April 1999 until December 10, 2010. McCarthy
      signed and certified Netflix’s false and misleading Form 10-Q for the quarterly
      period ending September 30, 2010. McCarthy also signed Netflix’s false and
      misleading Form 8-K dated October 20, 2010. McCarty also made false and
      misleading statements and material omissions on Netflix Earnings Calls on
      October 20, 2010 and during the Barclays Conference on December 8, 2010.
      McCarthy fraudulently knew that these statements were materially false and
      misleading at the time they were made.
      26. McCarthy sold more than 228,000 shares of Netflix common stock
      during the Class Period, reaping gross proceeds in excess of $41.7 million.
      27. Facts that are critical to Netflix’s “core operations” are presumably
      known by its key officers, including each of the Individual Defendants. In
      addition, the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their positions as Netflix’s senior
      executive officers, directly participated in the management of Netflix, and were
      directly involved in the day-to-day operations of Netflix at the highest levels, and
      were privy to confidential proprietary information concerning the Company and its
      business, operations, growth, financial statements, and financial condition, as
      alleged herein.
      28. Moreover, the Individual Defendants were involved in drafting,
      producing, reviewing and/or disseminating the false and misleading statements,
      information and omissions alleged herein, were aware, or recklessly disregarded,
      the fact that the false and misleading statements and omissions were being issued

      Sentiment: Strong Sell

    • C. The Individual Defendants
      21. Defendant Reed Hastings (“Hastings”) has served as Netflix’s Chief
      Executive Officer since September 1998 and as its Co-Founder and Chairman of
      the Board since the Company’s inception. Hastings signed and certified Netflix’s
      false and misleading Form 10-K for fiscal 2010, as well as its false and misleading
      Forms 10-Q for the quarterly periods ending September 30, 2010, March 31, 2011
      and June 30, 2011. Hastings also made false and misleading statements on Netflix
      Earnings Conference Calls (“Earnings Calls”) on October 20, 2010 and January 26,
      2011 and during a December 8, 2010 Barclays Capital Global Technology
      Conference (the “Barclays Conference”). Further, Hastings made false and
      misleading statements in a December 20, 2010 article appearing in an online blog,
      Seeking Alpha. Hastings fraudulently knew that these statements were materially
      false and misleading at the time they were made.
      22. Hastings sold more than 187,432 shares of Netflix stock during the
      Class Period, reaping gross proceeds in excess of $43 million.
      23. Defendant David Wells (“Wells”) has served as Netflix’s Chief
      Financial Officer since December 2010 and its Vice President of Financial
      Planning & Analysis from August 2008 to December 2010. He held the position
      of Director of Operations Planning & Analysis from March 2004 to August 2008.
      Wells signed and certified Netflix’s false and misleading Form 10-K for fiscal
      2010, as well as its false and misleading Forms 10-Q for the quarterly periods
      ending March 31, 2011 and June 30, 2011. In addition, Wells signed Netflix’s
      materially false and misleading Forms 8-K dated January 26, 2011, April 25, 2011,
      July 25, 2011, September 15, 2011 and October 24, 2011, and publicly-filed letters 9

      CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 3:12-CV-00225-SC
      to the SEC dated May 20, 2011 and July 11, 2011. Wells fraudulently knew that
      these statements were materially false and misleading at the time they were made.
      24. Wells sold more than 6,100 shares of Netflix common stock during
      the Class Period, reaping gross proceeds in excess of $1.5 million.
      25. Defendant Barry McCarthy (“McCarthy”) served as the Chief
      Financial Officer of Netflix from April 1999 until December 10, 2010. McCarthy
      signed and certified Netflix’s false and misleading Form 10-Q for the quarterly
      period ending September 30, 2010. McCarthy also signed Netflix’s false and
      misleading Form 8-K dated October 20, 2010. McCarty also made false and
      misleading statements and material omissions on Netflix Earnings Calls on
      October 20, 2010 and during the Barclays Conference on December 8, 2010.
      McCarthy fraudulently knew that these statements were materially false and
      misleading at the time they were made.
      26. McCarthy sold more than 228,000 shares of Netflix common stock
      during the Class Period, reaping gross proceeds in excess of $41.7 million.
      27. Facts that are critical to Netflix’s “core operations” are presumably
      known by its key officers, including each of the Individual Defendants. In
      addition, the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their positions as Netflix’s senior
      executive officers, directly participated in the management of Netflix, and were
      directly involved in the day-to-day operations of Netflix at the highest levels, and
      were privy to confidential proprietary information concerning the Company and its
      business, operations, growth, financial statements, and financial condition, as
      alleged herein.
      28. Moreover, the Individual Defendants were involved in drafting,
      producing, reviewing and/or disseminating the false and misleading statements,
      information and omissions alleged herein, were aware, or recklessly disregarded,
      the fact that the false and misleading statements and omissions were being issued

      Sentiment: Strong Sell

    • 3 NEW SCAM CRIME PARTNERS IN 2012

      TROWE PRICE
      Capital Research and Management Company
      CARL ICAHN

      MORGAN STANLEY AND GOLDMAN SACHS PLAYING MASSIVE FRAUD AGAIN IN 2012 ALONG WITH NEXUS SCAM GANG

      Sentiment: Strong Sell

      • 2 Replies to singhlion2001
      • C. The Individual Defendants
        21. Defendant Reed Hastings (“Hastings”) has served as Netflix’s Chief
        Executive Officer since September 1998 and as its Co-Founder and Chairman of
        the Board since the Company’s inception. Hastings signed and certified Netflix’s
        false and misleading Form 10-K for fiscal 2010, as well as its false and misleading
        Forms 10-Q for the quarterly periods ending September 30, 2010, March 31, 2011
        and June 30, 2011. Hastings also made false and misleading statements on Netflix
        Earnings Conference Calls (“Earnings Calls”) on October 20, 2010 and January 26,
        2011 and during a December 8, 2010 Barclays Capital Global Technology
        Conference (the “Barclays Conference”). Further, Hastings made false and
        misleading statements in a December 20, 2010 article appearing in an online blog,
        Seeking Alpha. Hastings fraudulently knew that these statements were materially
        false and misleading at the time they were made.
        22. Hastings sold more than 187,432 shares of Netflix stock during the
        Class Period, reaping gross proceeds in excess of $43 million.
        23. Defendant David Wells (“Wells”) has served as Netflix’s Chief
        Financial Officer since December 2010 and its Vice President of Financial
        Planning & Analysis from August 2008 to December 2010. He held the position
        of Director of Operations Planning & Analysis from March 2004 to August 2008.
        Wells signed and certified Netflix’s false and misleading Form 10-K for fiscal
        2010, as well as its false and misleading Forms 10-Q for the quarterly periods
        ending March 31, 2011 and June 30, 2011. In addition, Wells signed Netflix’s
        materially false and misleading Forms 8-K dated January 26, 2011, April 25, 2011,
        July 25, 2011, September 15, 2011 and October 24, 2011, and publicly-filed letters 9

        CONSOLIDATED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT - 3:12-CV-00225-SC
        to the SEC dated May 20, 2011 and July 11, 2011. Wells fraudulently knew that
        these statements were materially false and misleading at the time they were made.
        24. Wells sold more than 6,100 shares of Netflix common stock during
        the Class Period, reaping gross proceeds in excess of $1.5 million.
        25. Defendant Barry McCarthy (“McCarthy”) served as the Chief
        Financial Officer of Netflix from April 1999 until December 10, 2010. McCarthy
        signed and certified Netflix’s false and misleading Form 10-Q for the quarterly
        period ending September 30, 2010. McCarthy also signed Netflix’s false and
        misleading Form 8-K dated October 20, 2010. McCarty also made false and
        misleading statements and material omissions on Netflix Earnings Calls on
        October 20, 2010 and during the Barclays Conference on December 8, 2010.
        McCarthy fraudulently knew that these statements were materially false and
        misleading at the time they were made.
        26. McCarthy sold more than 228,000 shares of Netflix common stock
        during the Class Period, reaping gross proceeds in excess of $41.7 million.
        27. Facts that are critical to Netflix’s “core operations” are presumably
        known by its key officers, including each of the Individual Defendants. In
        addition, the Individual Defendants, by virtue of their positions as Netflix’s senior
        executive officers, directly participated in the management of Netflix, and were
        directly involved in the day-to-day operations of Netflix at the highest levels, and
        were privy to confidential proprietary information concerning the Company and its
        business, operations, growth, financial statements, and financial condition, as
        alleged herein.
        28. Moreover, the Individual Defendants were involved in drafting,
        producing, reviewing and/or disseminating the false and misleading statements,
        information and omissions alleged herein, were aware, or recklessly disregarded,
        the fact that the false and misleading statements and omissions were being issued

        Sentiment: Strong Sell

      • In 2012, Many Felt the Market Was Rigged
        By Michael Santoli | Yahoo! Finance – Mon, Dec 24, 2012 1:37 PM EST

        In 2012, investors’ long-harbored suspicion that the stock market was a rigged game became something of a majority opinion.
        This year, exasperation over the predominantly electronic mechanics of trading stocks, in which hyper-fast computer algorithms maneuver against one another for fractions of pennies collected over microseconds, boiled over. The level of disgust has gotten broad enough, in fact, that authorities might be prepared to rethink some of the basic rules and processes driving the system.
        The opaque and complex structure for trading stocks electronically across dozens of exchanges and alternative networks has long been justified by industry leaders and regulators as the messy but logical result of investor-friendly reforms. Technology has enabled mind-melting speed, unfathomable communications capacity and brutal competition for order flow – all of which have made trading cheaper and faster than ever.
        Yet by squeezing out traditional market makers who once collected low-risk, protected profits by mediating among buyers and sellers, rules and technology have tilted the power toward “high-frequency traders.” And in 2012, the fragility produced by so much layered complexity became too obvious, and produced too many market-jarring failures, to be considered merely the price of progress.
        A List of Failures
        In March of 2012, BATS Trading, an upstart exchange that sees a large percentage of its volume from HFT firms, botched its own initial public offering. First unable to process the initial trades, BATS ultimately canceled the IPO.
        In May, the Facebook (FB) initial public offering was mishandled by Nasdaq, whose systems couldn’t keep up with the flood of electric orders. Many small investors just mustering the will to wade back into the market to own a piece of FB were turned off by the fiasco.
        Only months later, Knight Capital Group (KCG), a premier electronic stockbroker and market maker, nearly went under when a trading-software upgrade went rogue and spewed orders without human intention or limit. Knight is now being acquired by HFT powerhouse Getco.
        A process that began in 2000, when regulators and exchanges moved to quote stocks in pennies -- making it easier for automated scalpers to “improve” a quote by one cent to legally front-run real orders while reducing the amount of stock behind each bid or offer -- has now agglomerated to a point that almost no one is satisfied. A recent publication of the staid New York Society of Security Analysts declared that “public confidence in the integrity of equity trading markets appears to be at a once-in-a-generation low.” This is a trend measured in the nearly $300 billion retail investors have yanked from traditional equity mutual funds since 2009.
        Do Robots Really Run the Market?
        But do the hyper-fast, disembodied trading robots really run the market for their own profit?
        There is some irony in the fact that the public is so embittered about what they believe to be a market rigged against them, when, for most, stock trading has never been easier or less costly. For a flat $8 commission, a stay-at-home investor can instantly execute a trade in almost any stock with little noticeable friction. If, at times, an opportunistic algorithm steps ahead of that order by, say, bidding a penny more and driving the price up a couple of cents, that charge is vastly less than the 25-cent spread Nasdaq market makers used to take on almost every trade. If anything, the small investor is better served by the current trading arrangements than are large institutional investors, whose need to execute large, sensitive orders is compromised by the software spies’ efforts to step in front of their trading flows.
        Indeed, even the dominance of high-frequency trading, once said to participate in a sizable majority of stock orders, has passed its peak, thanks to competition and lower market volatility reducing their opportunities.
        Still, somehow the opacity and bloodlessness of the automated quasi market-makers rankles more, especially when investors are less confident of unending stock market appreciation than they were in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
        Perception Becomes Reality
        The measure of disaffection with today’s market structure by both professionals and individuals means that, even if the financial impact to the typical trader isn’t onerous, the sour perception in itself diminishes market quality and vitality.
        And sentiment isn’t helped by the ongoing round-up of alleged insider-trading conspirators among employees of major investment firms, which has made headlines that prove the authorities are paying attention while also hinting to the little guy that investing profits are often ill-gotten.
        The good news in all the frustration with our tangled trading system is a renewed focus on rationalizing it. At a Senate Banking Committee hearing on electronic trading in late December, a rough consensus among exchange officials showed a desire for Congress to lay out clearer order-handling rules. The recently announced merger of electronic derivatives exchange ICE with NYSE Euronext could provide further impetus for a fresh look at the trading landscape.
        Several years ago, Jim Maguire -- a NYSE floor veteran and longtime specialist for Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRKA, BRKB) shares -- began promoting a small but potentially helpful reform: quoting stocks in minimum increments of nickels rather than pennies. The idea was to create greater incentive for middlemen to provide a deep and fair market for public orders. Dubbed “Mr. Nickel” by Barron’s, Maguire was viewed as a charming little anachronism. Yet on Feb. 5, the SEC is holding a panel discussion to discuss “the impact of tick sizes on securities markets.” There is also now a more open discussion over charging high-speed traders for the massive system capacity they use.
        The now deeply ingrained sense that stock trading is a game rigged by privileged sharpies with their omnipotent machines will not dissipate soon or easily. But as we enter 2013, it appears at last that those able to take action to foster greater faith in the integrity of the markets are at least focused on the issue.

        Sentiment: Strong Sell

 
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