I did not involve NFLX until today. I see so many folks were hurt by the MM.As someone said last night, after market close, only 3.6 million share trade. Definitely, that included some sales, So why the price go up $39? Anybody who is working in finacial field can tell us? Who decide the price? Buyers or sellers, or MM? From what I see is MM. Is any rules there to control MM? We see some similar situation happed in today'AAPL, OSIS, When market open OSIS only traded 12,000 shares, the price drop $10 already, Why? Last night traded? Do SEC have rules on making this GAP UP and GAP DOWN? and what is the GAPLIMIT?How should they decide GAP amount?
Actually, I think, MM don't care about the price. They only care their commissions. By scaring people one side, and make them PAIN, is the way to create PANIC sell volum, Meanwhile it can creat PROFIT sell for the other side. So what I see is MM always find a way to "SHAKE the TREE", and they have to SHARE HARD to make theur commissions.
Also, we see some rating firms screaming upgrade NFLX to $180, ..... Why do they did yesterday? What is the rules for controlling these firm? Are they benefit on themselves holding? Who monitor them?
We all have the experience that one day, we see a a stock drop, and we think this is a consolidation, After we jumped in, the price still goes down. What happened? Sometimes we also see, one day, two firm give out recommendations and one is broadcasted by many media, while the other just by some medias. Who decided to broadcast? Why they don't broadcast another one? What is the rule to control Media? The reason we lost because our media is not reported the "SELL recommandation" This is so called a part of "information imbalance".
From my experience, Wall Street is not a fair place to play, If you folks know anything more, please post here, and we should give this info to Mary Jo White for their SEC investigation,
Let us see if this appoint will make any difference here at S.E.C? LOL
Mob prosecutor Mary Jo White to be nominated to lead SEC
White would become the first prosecutor to lead the SEC in its history, showing Obama's commitment to Wall Street reform
Robert Khuzami's Successor
by Melanie Gretchen
Imagine a "black hole." Now imagine you're SEC Chairman Elisse Walter, on the job less than a month, and you're tasked with having to replace one of the agency's most influential officials – departing Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami.
In fact, given the number of departures throughout the agency, it would appear that Ms. Walter's biggest task in 2013 will be filling senior vacancies. Aside from the sudden departures of Chairman Mary Schapiro and Enforcement's Robert Khuzami, the SEC needs new Directors for its Divisions of Trading and Markets and of Corporation Finance. Oh, and did we mention that Chairman Walter's term is scheduled to end December 31, 2013?
Sentiment: Strong Sell
SEC Appointment. Ms. White, a partner at Debevoise & Plimpton, served nearly a decade as U.S. attorney in New York – the first woman named to this post. In that role she oversaw the prosecution of John Gotti, the 'Teflon Don' mafia boss, as well as the people responsible for the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ms. White also served as a director of Nasdaq. Otherwise, she has built her career on the legal side of Wall Street.
While seen as a strong enforcer as a U.S. attorney, Ms. White switched allegiances when she went to private practice – defending the likes of Ken Lewis, former CEO of Bank of America. This might create some friction, as well. Yet, as Dennis Kelleher, head of the nonprofit advocacy group, Better Markets, said: "She knew who the bad guys were, went after them and put them in prison when they broke the law."
Ms. White will succeed Elisse Walter, a longtime SEC official, who took over as Chairman after Mary Schapiro stepped down in December. It is expected that Ms. White will receive broad support, although she likely will be tested on her knowledge of the more arcane aspects of the financial markets. Mary Jo White's husband, John White, is a veteran of the SEC – having served from 2006 through 2008 as head of the Division of Corporation Finance.
CFPB Selection. Mr. Cordray was the attorney general of Ohio, where he made a name for himself by suing Wall Street companies in the wake of the financial crisis. He undertook a series of prominent lawsuits against big names in finance world, including Bank of America and the American Int'l Group.
Mr. Cordray joined the consumer bureau in 2011 as its enforcement director. Mr. Cordray's confirmation is expected to hit several speed bumps. Two years ago, the Senate declined to confirm Mr. Cordray after Republicans vowed to block any candidate for the consumer bureau, a new agency created to rein in the financial industry's excesses.
The White House expects Ms. White and Mr. Cordray to draw on their prosecutorial backgrounds while carrying out a broad regulatory agenda under the Dodd-Frank Act. Congress enacted the law, which mandates a regulatory overhaul, in response to the 2008 financial crisis.
SEC Candidates Not Selected. Others who were on the short list of viable candidates to head the SEC included longtime Wall Street executive Sallie Krawcheck, and current FINRA Chairman and CEO Richard Ketchum, Wall Street's internal policing organization, was also briefly mentioned as a long-shot contender.
While Mr. Ketchum will continue to be in the thick of regulatory reform, Ms. Krawchek is currently a Wall Street exec "without portfolio." She would make a fine regulatory head – given her market knowledge, her political savvy, and her many connections to the power brokers of Wall Street. Hopefully, an opportunity will arise in the near term.
Sentiment: Strong Sell
No, My point is how to fairly play the game on Wall Street. I think you may have some experience in your trading history that make you confused, like today's NFLX gap up $40 when opnning. Why $40, Why not $10, $20, Why not $50, $80? If you have similar confusion, we should ask SEC for an answer.
We didn’t have long to wait after Mary Schapiro’s announcement this morning to learn that her successor (at least temporarily) will be Elisse Walter. Speculation has it that Walter may also in the running to be the permanent agency head.
Walter and Schapiro worked together at FINRA, where Walter was Senior Executive Vice President, Regulatory Policy & Program. Walter also served as interim chairwoman in January 2009 between the terms of Christopher Cox and Mary Schapiro.
Walter is 62 and holds a Bachelors degree from Yale University and a JD from Harvard Law.
Sentiment: Strong Sell
That is why I preach on this boards that its us vs wall street instead of us vs us. I cant stand pumpers and bashers. If we would band together, yahoo finance could be an amazing place for the retail investor to band together and educate.
Friday, January 25th, 2013
Goldman V. Ex-Programmer, Round II
← Goldman Bonuses “Up” * BTIG & Knight * Nasdaq OMX Introduces New Unit * Spain Cuts * LawyersSecurity-Based Swaps: Proposed Capital, Margin, Segregation Rules →
[ by Melanie Gretchen ]
Goldman Sachs's former computer programmer Sergey Aleynikov is being prosecuted again for allegedly copying proprietary Goldman code in 2009 and taking it with him to a high-frequency trading start-up. The last time this case saw the inside of a courtroom, it was in federal court; this time, Manhattan Assistant District Attorney Joanne Li is taking Mr. Aleynikov in federal court on the grounds that he clearly violated state laws prohibiting the improper taking of computer material.
The Case Thus Far. The New Jersey programmer spent a year in prison until 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals tossed his conviction out last year and ordered him released. Before Manhattan Supreme Court Justice Ronald Zweibel issues a ruling in court on 2/1/5/13, the parties have argued the following:
Manhattan Assistant District Attorney Joanne Li argued that the 2nd Circuit's ruling was based on elements in the federal statutes that are not part of the state laws, which means the case falls under an exception to the double jeopardy rule. Nevertheless, statutes were intended to prevent individuals from copying material for their own personal gain.
Defense attorney Kevin Marino on Friday said Aleynikov should not have to defend himself again for the same conduct that led to the federal case. Moreover, state statutes don't apply because his client had the right to access and copy the code.
"There is a word for this prosecution, and it is inhuman. He's lost his home. He's lost his family. He's lost every penny he's ever saved … the reality is, Sergey Aleynikov has suffered enough." – Mr. Marino, before the court.
The case: People v. Aleynikov, New York State Supreme Court, New York County, No. 60353/2012.
Sentiment: Strong Sell
Robert Khuzami Neither Admits Nor Denies
By: masaccio Sunday December 2, 2012 10:45 am
Robert Khuzami: nothing to see here
SEC enforcement chief Robert Khuzami testified before Congress to explain why the SEC allows lawbreakers to settle without admitting guilt. His threadbare rationalization has been given by regulators for decades, even as financial crimes and misdemeanors have become more common and more dangerous. It’s simply amazing that in the face of massive criticism Khuzami fails to offer any rationale applicable to the situation today. But he is on the short list to take over as Chair of the SEC, an obvious case of rewarding failure when failure was the goal of the Obama Administration.
Everyone in the financial sector knows they can get away with minor fines for the most egregious frauds, because the regulators no longer believe in beating the #$%$ out of them. Here’s Khuzami proving that point:
Cases arising out of the financial crisis have been a particular priority of the Enforcement Division: to date, we have filed actions against 102 individuals and entities, naming 55 CEOs, CFOs, and other senior corporate officers, and obtaining orders for $2 billion.
That $2 billion Khuzami loves so much wouldn’t cover the investor losses from a randomly chosen group of ten real estate mortgage-backed securities from 2006, let alone the thousands sold by Wall Street. That group of executives doesn’t include any of the major Wall Street players. And Khuzami doesn’t even point out that individuals rarely pay significant sums; their employers pay them.
SEC Policy on Settlements
SEC policy is to accept a settlement
… only when our informed judgment tells us that the settlement agreement is within the range of outcomes we reasonably can expect if we litigate through trial. In making that determination, we take into account many factors, including: (i) the strength of the evidence and the potential defenses, including the possibility that the Commission might not prevail at trial, or prevail but be awarded less than the proposed settlement achieves; (ii) the delay in returning funds to harmed investors caused by litigation; and (iii) the resources required for a trial, including, most importantly, the opportunity costs of litigating rather than devoting those resources to investigating other cases.
That policy that might have worked in markets where reputation was crucial to survival of an investment bank, but if that were ever true in the past, it isn’t true today.
As a general rule, the parties settle if they agree on the range of outcomes and the chances for each outcome, and if they agree on the general range of costs associated with each outcome.
It’s pretty easy to evaluate a car crash case*. There are rules of thumb, and local lawyers have a pretty good idea of how things will go with local judges and juries. That’s why you see so many settlements.
Evaluating the Strength of a Securities Fraud Case
It’s hard to evaluate a securities fraud case. There is a lot of paper. The victims are always invisible, and many seem on first glance to be unappealing. The defense lawyers can throw out junk arguments, thinking that the jury won’t understand which arguments have merit and which are just smokescreens. The lawyers don’t have a clear idea of how a local judge or jury will react, and they don’t have a lot of experience with trials. The rules of thumb about cases were developed in wholly different times.
Here’s an example. The decisions to create RMBSs and how they are funded are made by one group of people. Another group decides on the specifics of the construction of the securities. Another group writes the offering materials and disclosure documents. Another group does due diligence. And yet another group does the selling. One argument that seems to work for these cases is the empty chair argument: why did you single out my guy when all those other guys were equally or more responsible?
Once it became clear that people took the empty chair argument seriously, and were furious with the SEC for singling out some schmuck, no matter how guilty, the solution was obvious. Name all of the schmucks and let them point fingers at each other. And for heaven’s sake, put blood on the floor: bring in victims to show how badly they were damaged.
Learning Nothing or the Wrong Lesson
That didn’t happen because of two specific decisions made by Khuzami. First, the SEC singled out one guy, and didn’t bother the higher-ups, especially the lawyers and accountants who made the decisions about disclosure and accounting. Second, the SEC decided only to prosecute a single example of RMBS fraud at each bank. Except, of course, Deutsche Bank, Khuzami’s former employer and issuer of RMBSs, where no case was filed.
Khuzami claims the SEC settles when it gets what it thinks is in the range of possible outcomes in a trial. Given the incompetence of their trial tactics, it may be so. But I don’t think so. The SEC should have tried a number of cases to learn what judges and juries think in these radically different circumstances. But because of Khuzami’s decision to sue each investment bank over a single RMBS, there was no opportunity to learn either new tactics or about the detailed responses of judges and juries to the horrible facts of RMBS fraud. The outcome is that cases were settled too cheaply.
The SEC knows this. It wins its silly million dollar insider trading cases because it has experience at trying lots of them. Not so with the hundreds of billions lost in RMBS cases. The SEC learned the lesson that it couldn’t win. It failed to learn the actual lesson: use better trial tactics.
The SEC settled with Goldman Sachs in one of the ABACUS deals for $550 million. That’s a big number. But there were 25 ABACUS deals, with a value of $10.9 billion. The SEC only sued over one. That means that there is nothing useful for the losers in the other 24, and nothing for the investors in similar deals. If you calculate the losses for all of them, that $550 million looks like chump change. Furthermore, the ABACUS deals were masterminded by Jonathan Egol. He didn’t get sued, and was appointed as a Managing Director at Goldman Sachs. The only individual sued was Fabrice Tourre, a French guy who sold the deals. Empty chair, anyone?
The Resources Argument
Khuzami also makes an argument about resources: if the SEC settles, the resources can be used on other cases. If this had any merit, we’d certainly see more cases than we do. But it isn’t true. The lawyers go all the way through preparation for a trial, interviewing all witnesses, and considering all defenses offered in the defendant’s Wells Submission. Then they write a complaint. All that is left is to handle discovery and go to trial.
And yes, that is a load. But in February 2009, when Khuzami was appointed, it would have been easy for him to have demanded additional resources and done the necessary work. Instead, he and SEC Chair Mary Schapiro decided to use the prosecutors and investigators they had, all hired under Bush and Clinton, neither of whom wanted aggressive enforcement. He also forced a bunch of administrators back into field work instead of firing them and hiring people burning with desire to lock up cheats and frauds.
It is clear that Khuzami and Schapiro were doing exactly what Treasury Secretary Geithner and presumably President Obama wanted: let my bankers go.
Perhaps that is why Khuzami is on the short list for Chair of the SEC. Failing upwards is an easy way to reward the plutocrats while seeming to govern. This slovenly defense of an antiquated policy may just do the trick, but it reveals that the SEC is a thoroughly captured agency.
* Suppose we have a car crash case. One outcome is total win for the plaintiff, another is a total win for the defendant, and then there are in between possibilities, partial liability for each party. Suppose the parties think that there is no possibility that the defendant gets off, a 10% chance that the plaintiff is 30% at fault, a 40% chance that the plaintiff is 10% at fault, and a 50% chance that the plaintiff is not at fault. Then suppose that the damages are set at $100K and costs of trial are $10K for each side. Then the expected outcome is easy to calculate:
.10 * .70 * 100K = $ 7,000
.40 * .90 * 100K = $36,000
.50 * 1.0 * !00K = $50,000
Less cost of trial: 10,000
The case should settle at $83,000, give or take a little. Plaintiff might take a bit less, for example, because she pays a smaller legal fee in a settlement than in a litigated case. Defendant might pay a little more for internal reasons, or because of somewhat different evaluations of the possibilities, or because the case is notorious and it might hurt future business not to pay.
Sentiment: Strong Sell