Those of you old FVBers out there will remember Barry's last tour with his 'town hall' meetings (which concluded in November of 2002)when he also said he had every intention to remain independent. Well, what a difference a couple months makes! Sure, that's the intention, but it tends to get diverted much easlier than anyone thinks. The song and dance about what a great performer FVB was didn't go very far...we'll see about this one.
Missy, actually I'm not an FVBer, but I was around those town hall tours, and I knew even then of impending FVB sale. The difference with John Allison is he is responding to questions not making announcements. Quite simply BBandT is not for sale. Quite simply at this time there is no bank in the USA that sees any improvement they can make in BBandTs efficiency, leaness, or improvement above that which BBandT itself is making. Anyone that cares to review my previous posts will see that I said when BBandT improves its mortgage area, it will improve its EPS.
Their CGQ did not improve of their own volition but by two externalities, one legal, one self-interest.
First, the quotient improved to 66.9% after responding to the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) mandates. This is still poor for the 9th largest financial institution vs. Citigroup 97.1%. Be mindful that it was only 10 weeks ago that Allison and Reed got serious about SOX requirements with the hiring of a new general counsel, Patricia Oliver, with SOX compliance experience.
Second, please note oneyoungdoctor's June 17 post 8483 about BB&T's low percentage of institutional investors. The reason? Many institutional investors focus on the CGQ and resulting ISS proxy advice thereof. Needless to say, companies as BB&T with low CGQs aren't happy to have their scores disclosed to institutional investors and are incentivized to improve. Thereafter BB&T paid ISS $17,000 for access to their online rating system [ http://www.isscgq.com/ ], entered a number of policy changes, some of which were ultimately implemented (post 8405 poison pill elimination), and, voil�, raised its CGQ from 44.8% to 66.9%.
FYI, with D&O liability insurance premiums increasing 200% to 400%, companies as BB&T with underfunded D&O policies are additionally motivated to improve their CGQ.