very exciting reading, now my question what part did you play in this or what is the connection to you. I don't believe the viets, china have any old prisoners from the vietnam war. The loss of respect factor would have cost the lives of these people. Viet government like any other government thinks hiding history is the next best thing to being honorable. Governments in general don't seem to have a problem with being garbage, they just don't want it broadcast. Whether its Kennedy or Pearl Harbour, the story actually makes much more sense then the facts. I think its call plausability or yea yea thats the ticket.
Yet on March 31, 1972, two Army enlisted soldiers, Sp/4 Bruce A. Crosby and Sp/5 Gary P. Westcott were
inside a bunker at Fire Base Sarge in Quang Tri province, engaged in monitoring NVA communications. The
base came under artillery attack and their bunker sustained a direct hit. According to an American advisor on
the scene, "They were located in a bunker approximately 35 meters to the east of my position. About midday I
learned that their bunker had been hit. During a lull in the shelling, I crawled over to their bunker to find it
enveloped in flames, and no sign of life about. It was obvious that the two Americans in the bunker had been
killed instantly when they took a direct hit."
Eventually the base was overrun by the advancing NVA troops from the 304th Division. The Vietnamese history
of the 304th Division, published in 1990, states, the order to begin artillery fire on Dong Toan [Sarge] was
received by 68th Artillery Regiment at 1145 on 30 March 1972. The 66th Regiment [of the 304th Division] finally
took Dong Toan base at 0600 on 1 April 1972. "We killed 350 men of the 4th Battalion of the 147th Brigade and
captured 25 men alive [Vietnamese Marines], including two American advisors."
What happened to Crosby and Westcott? Did they die in the bunker, or were they captured alive as the
Vietnamese state? According to the November 1995 DPMO scrub of this case, no information on the two men
has been turned over unilaterally by the Vietnamese, a JTF-FA survey of the site in 1993 revealed no remains or
much material evidence, and that based on the testimony of Boomer and other hearsay reports indicating the
men died in the bunker, and the lack of any further information, DPMO recommended the case be placed in the
category of No Further Pursuit, which means that no one is actively looking for Crosby and Westcott. How then
can the Vietnamese be said to be cooperating when an officially sanctioned Party document states, indirectly at
least, that the two were captured alive? How is it that the Vietnamese have not alerted the U.S. government to
the information published in an official history of one of their most famous divisions? Further, if Quang was the
commander of MRTTH, of which the 304th Division was a part, and they claim the capture of two Americans in
the same location that two men go missing, how is it he doesn't know anything about it? Like most denials by
Quang, this one should also be met with deeper analysis.
Everywhere we turned there were North Vietnamese units hunting for us. They were above
us and below us. After two days of running, on Easter Sunday, at around 9 o'clock in the
morning, we were in 6-foot-high elephant grass--almost out of the jungle. The NVA
discovered us. We were surrounded and getting hit pretty hard. At that point, my troops
broke and ran. I tried to stop them from running and turned around. In fact, I was yelling and
shooting over their heads. The damn NVA heard me. I distinctly heard a North Vietnamese
exclaim, 'Co van! Co van!' [American adviser]. I said, 'Crap! It's time to get out of here.'
"We finally regrouped and fell back to the Cua Viet River and dug in for a last stand. The
Eastertide Offensive was a product of the North Vietnamese having changed to commanders
who were well schooled in Soviet conventional tactics. That included saturation artillery fire
and armor assaults. My unit faced sporadic tank attacks, from Soviet- or Chinese-built T-54
and T-55 models. We used a combination of weapons to stop one column of 15 to 20 tanks.
We used field artillery fire very effectively. Other units stopped tanks at short range with
LAWs [shoulder-fired, light anti-tank weapons]. We came away from that experience with
the knowledge that once you overcome your initial fear, you certainly can fight tanks
"Our forces were dug in on the banks of the Cua Viet River, preparing for a classic set piece
battle. We were all that stood between the advancing NVA and Hue City. We stopped
them. And with the help of U.S. air support, we began to push the North Vietnamese back."
In March 1972, then-Major Boomer was serving as an adviser to a VNMC battalion in
Quang Tri province. As he relates: "the battalion was at a mountaintop outpost called Fire
Support Base Sarge. It was the farthest western outpost, overlooking Route 9 near the Cam
Lo River. We were seeing North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units moving into our area from
Laos. They were rolling in large truck convoys and becoming pretty blatant.
"Heavy monsoon rains prevented helicopters from flying supplies to us. We were desperately
low on food. So Major De, the South Vietnamese commander, split our battalion in two. I
stayed at Fire Base Sarge with two infantry companies, a mortar platoon and the battalion
commander's headquarters. Captain Ray Smith went with the other half of the battalion about
1,000 meters north on Nui Ba Ho mountain."
General Boomer continues: "On March 30, the Thursday before Easter, three North
Vietnamese divisions attacked across the DMZ into Quang Tri province. Sarge and Nui Ba
Ho were hit with a devastating artillery and rocket barrage. Infantry units of the NVA 308th
Division moved into assault positions. We were surrounded. Storm clouds prevented Air
Force gunships from providing us with fire support because the North Vietnamese were too
close to our own position. Around 75 percent of our north perimeter defenses were
pulverized by the relentless incoming explosions. They just killed us with artillery and rocket
fire, then followed it with waves of ground forces.
"After 24 hours, I received a radio message from Captain Smith that Nui Ba Ho was being
overrun. My troops bravely kept fighting, but my counterpart Major De and I knew that we
could not hold Sarge much longer. After midnight, with the NVA swarming through our
defenses, Major De made the decision for whoever was still alive to escape from Sarge.
"It became a desperate matter of pure survival. Close to half of our battalion was killed or
wounded. Using the cover of smoke and darkness, we had to escape and evade in the jungle
down the side of the mountain. It was not an organized 'fighting' retreat. We had a lot of
walking wounded with us. We struggled through the dense jungle undergrowth down the
It was 1967 we had bugged out of the Oasis and set up back at base camp (Camp Enari). My dog had bit the C.O.'s little house girl in the butt and we had some stern words. The battle was tempered but we both knew who would would win and my name wasn't on that list. That's another story we'll come back to another day. While I was at base camp regular army life and crap work details were becoming normal. During this time Monsoon rains were in full tilt, the whole world was nothing but mud and brown puddles. This morning I was on garbage detail with a pfc which I had never met before, Jim something. He was a guy that the war had beatin down and there was nothing left inside. Young not stupid, no personality, sense of humor just empty. We worked all day got along fine, he never had anything to say, every day was the same and nothing mattered to him. All his remarks, it doesn't matter, just another day, thats the way it goes and you'll be the same way one of these days. I instantly read this guy as a nice person who was just beat and I still feel that way. Two weeks later we would bug out of Camp Enari and meet up and join the 69th Armor and one night later he would die. As usual when that happens there is no time but to keep going and no stopping for thoughts. A week later we were having a little memorial service for him, In a mud colored dirty tent with a dirt floor. At one end somebody deciding that was the front, his rifle with fixed bayonet was stuck in the ground beside the rifle was a pair of boots and beside that was his helmet, stupid, silly, comical and heart touching. I was feeling like I might cry at any time and the thoughts of the display of articles looking very short and thinking damn thats all thats left. I guess the reason this sticks with me is I didn't know the day I spent with Jim was precious or that I didn't know him long enough to like or dislike him. There were people that I knew that bit the dust that lets say theives and some cruel that I didn't mind not seeing for eternity. What I'm finding is the guilt that a lot of people feel isn't from what we did or didn't do but we're glad it wasn't me.
Diod is one of those boring stocks that is very volatile. And overvalued. I think in this economy, I would pay no more than 5 bucks for the stock for its growth has been stalled for no more than 5% per year.
This week should test DIOD around 5 bucks or less.
DOWN DOWN BABE!
you did it...2 atta boys in one day...
keep up the good work
the psychological concept for the behavior you commented on is either displacement. or projection...I can't remeber which...college was so many years ago
I've never recommended any stocks. I'm just angry that some OTC scum are trying to deceive people out of their money by recommending DIOD as a long-term investment, when DIOD is nothing but trader trash. The SEC should be notified of this pump-and-dump scam! Maybe you can tell me how DIOD is going to pay for this Far East expansion that's going to be its salvation? The insider should just repurchase all o/s shares and go private again.