My thoughts are that they wouldn't give these indications in two successive filings if they didn't mean business. Too much negativity already surrounding the stock. They are only trying to do this not to make that worse, instead indeed in an attempt to make the price "happier" if you ask me, also in relation to their coming R/S.
And in a scenario where this "hope/promise" is broken... Just not going to happen. Too much negativity has already manifested and in circulation. Giving a "promise" and then breaking it is worse than not making that promise at all, and would do even more harm to the psychology of the stock. The sentence you are quoting are sending hope and expectation out there. Doing the opposite now will have even worse implications to stock price than not sending out hope at all. They want positivity surrounding the stock now, and an offer price higher, or in worst case similar, is a good place to start.
1. I'm too uninformed, and too dim-witted to be able to understand the hard financial facts on which the recap offering is based. It looks like Jodie, and TradeLogic, and Flipper, and montecker, and Tiger, and Nick, et alia ** DO ** understand, so I'm just struggling to keep up, in the hope that "the light will go on" in my feeble brain eventually.
2. HOWEVER: Morten brings up the topic of "sentiment" and I emphatically think these "psychological" details are highly relevant to this situation. They may seem to be "soft" relative to the hard, quantitative financial details, but I think they're important. Aren't they seen in ALL economic phenomena? Why is economics categorized as as "social science" rather than as a "hard science"? It's highly quantitative, with "economietric" modeling, etc., but it's BASED on SENTIMENT!
If you're a business person and you're deciding whether to make a capital investment, you WON'T run that risk if you're pessimistic about the outlook for economic growth in the relevant geographic area. Sentiment seems to be relevant to this offering, as Morten points out. Sentiment seems to have been relevant throughout the entire history of the EMU/Greek "Sovereign Debt Crisis," since the crisis began in Greece in 2010. How often have the Jens Weidmann-type hardliners seemed, adamantly, to REFUSE even to CONSIDER accommodation of Greece, shortly before the troika "caved" and accommodated Greece on one more point or another? The hardliners may have been stressing the hard, objective financial facts, but politics and sentiment "ruled the day" in the end.