I also noticed another important (I think) subtlety in wording. Whenever the SC is saying “yes, you can award expectation damages,” they were always careful to phrase it such that it would be applicable to cases in general for purposes of establishing precedent, not only this Siga case. From page 37: “Because we had not previously addressed whether Delaware recognizes Type II preliminary agreements and permits A PLAINTIFF to recover expectation damages…” and from page 2: “"Where A TRIAL JUDGE makes a factual finding, supported by the record, that THE PARTIES would have reached an agreement but for THE DEFENDANT’s bad faith negotiation, we hold that A TRIAL JUDGE may award expectation damages.” (caps are my emphasis) They were very careful not to explicitly direct or allow “the Vice Chancellor” to award expectation damages.
I only thought to look at the wording more closely because I was revisiting the Guzzetta case I posted about in an earlier thread. And in there, when the SC reversed and remanded Parsons, I noticed that their wording was specifically in reference to only the case being decided. For example: “the trial court's decision to set the bond at $10,000 remains problematic” and “it does not appear from the record that the Guzzettas' remaining estimated damages are unreasonable.” So from this it must have been clear to Parsons that he had to change the amount of the award given that the SC thought it was too low.