Actually, the first article is about neutral. The second is very negative. Personally, I agree with the first. IMO, Vale needs a better CFO.
Supposedly TRIB earned $4.3M this quarter. This is not reflected in the shareholder equity, and the cash level. At first look, it appears like a sleight-of-hand accounting. I'll have to study the full 10-Q when published.
Ended the quarter with $9.1M cash, an increase of $0.15M from the beginning of the quarter. The cash level is very low; yet, TRIB needs to pay soon about $5.1M dividend.
Total revenues for Q4, 2014 were $26.7M. EPS,18 cents. Both are slightly below expectations. TRIB grows very sluggishly despite the Premier instruments.
Doing a Google search on 100G CFP4 LR4 Transceiver I see that the two big dogs Avago and Finisar have it. Do you think that Oclaro will have a profitable gross margin on this product line when it will have to compete against Avago and Finisar?
Do not post wrong information!
On Feb 11, 2009:
//After months of potential acquisition talks, Microchip Technology Inc Tuesday officially ended its pursuit of FPGA maker Atmel Corp.
Microchip launched its bid for Atmel valued at $2.3 billion in early October 2008, with its partner in the proposal, ON Semiconductor, signed on to buy Atmel’s nonvolatile memory and RF and automotive businesses.
Atmel rejected the bid in late October, claiming that the $5 per share bid undervalued its future potential and noting its transformation plan, which includes fab closures and other cost-cutting measures.
In November, as the full weight of the global financial crisis became more evident, ON Semi backed out of the proposal. Microchip at that time said it would consult with its board and advisors to determine their next steps in due course.
In this most recent move, Microchip has also withdrawn the slate of directors it had nominated previously for election at Atmel’s next annual meeting of shareholders.
“The global economy and the semiconductor business environment have deteriorated significantly since Microchip first made an offer of $5 per share on October 1, 2008," said Steve Sanghi, president, CEO, and chairman of Microchip, in a statement. "In light of the economic uncertainty and the lack of visibility that continues to exist with respect to Atmel’s business, Microchip is no longer able to put a value on Atmel. Microchip will therefore terminate consideration of a potential acquisition of Atmel//
This is why ATML is up nicely today. One can only hope that Atmel is acquired too. $11 per share would be a fair and achievable price presently. However, Atmel's management and BOD have been milking the company for too long and they may not let it go. LSI traded similarly to ATML and it was acquired for $11+ about a year after it had initiated dividends. Atmel initiated dividends in this quarter.
ARUN concentrates on mobility and unlike EXTRA it is growing fast "Last Thursday Aruba reported $212.9 million in second quarter revenue, up 21% from a year earlier. It’s adjusted net income was $22.8 million, or 30 cents per share beating Wall Street analysts’ consensus by 3 cents." Extreme's performance (as a company and as an investment) is an insult to its long time investors. What makes a company valuable is high growth rate in a hot field in which the company is competitive and a clear leader. Can you say that about Extreme? I don't think so.
Let's go back to Sep 2006: iron was about $33/ton and trending upwards; Vale's share price was about $10 and its tangible book value was about $3/sh. Now it is Mar 2015: the share price is about $7.5 and the tangible book value is about $6; iron is depressed at about $60/ton.
There were predictions last year that the price of iron will get to $60 but not from the mainstream analysts.. However, Vale's CEO predicted confidently $80-$90 which was foolish or self-serving. China's iron consumption is the main reason for the rise of the iron price since 2006. The present situation is that China's consumption has slowed down considerably while the iron supply has become very excessive, so it is realistic that iron will stay at $60 for a couple of years or even longer.
Nevertheless, based on the historical valuations of VALE the share price should not drop much from its present value because at $60/ton Vale still has positive cash flow from its iron operations. The recent quarterly losses have been due to very poor hedging on foreign currencies. The CFO of Vale needs to be replaced. VALE should get in a hurry to $10+ when/if it actually posts positive earnings.
The TANGIBLE book value (stockholders' equity minus goodwill minus intangibles) is negative and trending lower. The tangible book value declined from $-1.624M in June 30 to $-6.641M in December 30. Because EXTR does not pay dividends and does not repurchase its shares (actually, it dilutes the shares), the tangible book value is a key measure of how EXTR is really doing.
From the recent 10-Q:
December 31, 2014 June 30, 2014
Total stockholders’ equity: 134,116 156,712
Goodwill: 70,877 70,877
Intangible assets, net: 69,880 87,459
One can only hope. ELX is like EXTR, stagnant/falling revenues and profits. However, it is more profitable than EXTR and it has a tangible book value of about $1.7. Extreme's tangible book is slightly negative. ELX is acquired by Avago for $8 or about 1.4 x sales. EXTR trades at 0.6 x sales. IMO, if EXTR is acquired NOW, it won't get more than 1 x sales, so $6 is the best that can be hoped for. However, I believe that Berger and BOD will wait until 2016, either admitting defeat and selling EXTR for $5 (if they find a buyer) or actually succeeding in growing the company to be worth $8 to $10.
Wrong and misleading facts. Oclaro reached $18 (for very short duration) 4 years ago, not 3. It was due to pumping by its CEO and Cramer (claiming imminent sales growth to $1B annually). At that time it had fewer than 50M shares outstanding and its market cap was below $900M.. Oclaro was more diversified then and it actually earned few cents per share for a couple of quarters. Since then, Oclaro has sold all of its profitable assets and has vastly diluted its share count. Oclaro has not been profitable for the last 3 years and it is not expected to be profitable until late 2016, if at all. Therefore Oclaro is not worth more than its tangible book value now.
Because their CFO and his underlings are incompetent as the following attest:
"(i) foreign exchange and monetary losses (- US$ 1.257 billion)13; (ii) currency and interest rate swap losses (-US$ 524 million);"
Vale's iron operations are competitive but its financial hedging activities are very poorly done.
n 4Q14, there was a loss of US$ 1.849 billion against a loss of US$ 1.437 billion in 3Q14. Underlying earnings accrued a loss of US$ 251 million after excluding the following one-off effects: (i) foreign exchange and monetary losses (- US$ 1.257 billion)13; (ii) currency and interest rate swap losses (-US$ 524 million); (iii) impairment of assets (-US$ 378 million) and related tax credit impairment (US$ 70 million); (iv) relinquishment of land associated with the renewal of PTVI ́s CoW in Indonesia (-US$ 167 million); (v) fair value on financial instruments (US$ 17 million); (vi) mark-to- market of shareholder debentures (US$ 62 million); and (vii) tax adjustments (US$ 579 million).
The impairments recognized in 4Q14 were: (i) US$ 1.053 billion related to the overall fertilizers assets in Brazil due to worsened market conditions; (ii) US$ 635 million in Simandou, complementing the impairment of US$ 500 million booked in 2Q14, as the discussions with the Government of Guinea did not progress as expected and the uncertainties increased regarding the recognition of, and the compensation for, Vale’s investments in the country; (iii) US$ 238 million at VNC, as the ramp-up process has taken longer than expected; and (iv) US$ 69 million related to Australian coal assets as a result of Isaac Plains and Integra Coal mines being put under care and maintenance. In 4Q14, we also booked an impairment reversal of US$ 1.617 billion at Onça Puma, out of the original impairment of US$ 2.849 billion recorded in 4Q12, as operations resumed production successfully.
TLAB was as bad as EXTR. It was also controlled by its founder while deteriorating and losing out to the competition. It was sold for not much than its tangible book value. The tangible book value of EXTR is negative. NT was even worse. It was liquidated in bankruptcy. Extreme is a relic from the 2000. It should have been sold long ago. Now Berger put together two relics, Extreme and Enterasys, trying to revitalize them via synergies and new hirings of top management positions. This is a tall order. Nobody would listen anymore to Berger until Extreme shows signs of growth in revenues and profits.
Apparently the product line of EXTR is not leading edge and it is not in great demand. The sales numbers do not lie. You can do only that much tinkering with the sales force and establishing partnership programs. ARUN is growing profitably, EXTR is not.
They should have sold Extreme when Foundry was sold. However, even then Foundry was making money while Extreme was not. Also, the chairman of the board then was a co-founder of EXTR (Gordon Stitt), and he had large voting power and would not sell EXTR. By the time he was forced out, it was too late.
1. It appears that Soros owns the Notes, NOT the stock per se. If Oclaro does well so will the converted stock and everyone will benefit. However, Soros fund is a ruthless hedge fund. If Oclaro does poorly, Soros will not convert but instead drive Oclaro into liquidation by demanding the cash in full. The Notes are senior to the common shares. Soros as a Note holder is not necessarily positive for OCLR's common shareholders..
2. Soros has not always done well with small tech companies. Check his history with EXTR.