As noted before, I expect that depends on where you are. My fuel cost for residential gas service in February 2014 was $0.6847 per Ccf. This year it's set at $0.4266. In my case, the price adjusts monthly, and is directly tied to the settlement price of the front month NYMEX contract.
I don't doubt that there are many folks out there who are locked in to a flat rate contract; that option is available here, also. One needs to take the time to run some comparative models before signing on to these. In our area, it is extremely rare that the independent contract providers' offers produce a savings over the standard service offer, and them independents are quite often higher.
I'm not sure what to think, but I do have a couple of observations.
On the oil side, I'd note that in the 2009-2011 time frame, we typically pumped less than 6 million barrels per day of domestic crude. Right now we're running over 9 million bbl. per diem, and have been over 8 million since the end of 2013. Out imports, in the same period, have shifted in an inverse proportion, but it seems fairly clear that the folks from whom we used to import have kept on pumping as well.
I don't think oil (or gas, for that matter) can stay where they are indefinitely, but the sheer volume of capacity that's available will certainly inform any subsequent rebound.
On the banking side, I'd note that FNMA is once again offering (and packaging) "97% LTV" mortgages. Seems these folks never learn.
From a Reuters article this morning regarding Alibaba (BABA):
"The State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), in a report published on its website on Wednesday, said many products sold on Alibaba's e-commerce websites and services infringed upon trademarks, were substandard or fake, were banned or endangered public security.
Alibaba declined to comment on the report.
SAIC said its report summarised a July 16, 2014, meeting between government business regulators and Alibaba, and said it had delayed releasing the report until now to avoid affecting Alibaba's September initial public offering.
SAIC did not elaborate on that decision. The report was later removed from the main page of SAIC's website."
Now, I don't know whether possession of that information would necessarily have deterred a potential investor from buying BABA at the IPO, but there seems little question that it is material information of which both Alibaba and the Chinese government were well aware long in advance of the IPO date. It is also abundantly clear that the PRC government was complicit in withholding this from investors.
I'll be most interested to see how long it takes for the lawyers to begin circling this.
Don't know how many here follow Dr. Paul Gillis's accounting blog, but it's well worth a look this month.
Evidently the PRC Ministry of Commerce has published a piece of model legislation that could result in dramatic changes in the way VIE's are handled there, rendering some potentially unnecessary, and, on the opposite end of the scale, perhaps some would become untenable.
Dr. Gillis is, of curse, an accountant, , and freely concedes his limited expertise with regard to Chinese law, but he also provides some links to commentary offered by Chinese legal practitioners that is instructive.
Here's another option I use:
Go to the EDGAR "advanced search" page, and select Form 13F-HR as the document to search.
Enter the CUSIP of the stock of interest (in SCOK's case, 829357102) as the search term in the "full text search" dialogue box. (I don't use the issuer name, as different reporting institutions may abbreviate, misspell, etc... The CUSIP should be the same in all cases.)
You should get a return of all Form 13F-HR filers who reported ownership of the stock. By comparing the filings for the most recent quarter reported (the 13F-HR is, I believe, due not later than 45 days from the end of the reporting quarter) with those of the previous, you can obtain a fair notion of changes, up or down, in institutional holdings.
Well, I'm mindful that, of all this flurry of press releases, the only one that generated a From 8-k filing was ABAT's announcement of the dismissal of EFP Rotenberg back on 21 October.
Now, I'd concede that companies generate a certain amount of "fluff" PR that doesn't necessarily rise to the level that would trigger the 8-k filing, but the engagement of Paritz, I'd think, should have done, particularly since they went to the trouble of filing notice of the former auditor's dismissal.
Leaves me wondering whether ABAT is really the source for this, or some other entity who can''t certify the 8-k.
The SEC proceeding against China Valves Technology, Inc. (CVVT) has taken a curious turn.
The original OIP was filed on 29 September 2014 (See SEC Administrative Proceeding file 3-16176). CVVT responded on 9 October, admitting all allegations in the SEC complaint, but asserting that the revocation of its securities was "...not necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors at (that) time...", and further reserving a "...right to plead any additional defenses.".
The proceeding has been thrice delayed, with the consent of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, on the basis that negotiations were ongoing to produce a consent settlement.
Today, a stay order was filed, without further commentary (and without setting any further action dates), apparently wit no objection from the Division.
Not sure what's in the works there, but it surely bears watching.
I expect it depends on where you are.
I'm in central Ohio. Bills here break down roughly as follows: energy (natural gas per se) charges, 55%; transportation charges, 39%; taxes, 6%.
We're in a "deregulated" state, so we can either contract for the fuel cost with an independent supplier, or use the utility's "standard service offer" (SSO). Due to the manner in which Columbia Gas handles the SSO, it's almost always cheaper than the independent offers, and you see an immediate change in unit cost, as this is tied to the settlement price of the front month NYMEX contract.
That doesn't necessarily translate into a saving on the overall bill, though, as the transportation and tax charges may fluctuate, as well.
Oh, absolutely! Nothing quite screams "buy" like a stock that's lost over 98% of its value in less than a year. (ATHI started trading on 29 April 2014 at $2.10, immediately following a 1:96 reverse split. Backing out the split, that puts today's closing price of $0.04 at a pre-split value $0.000417. Hard to find deals like that these days.)
I suspect what we're seeing here is the final covering on short positions founded on the warrants ABAT issued back in June of 2009 (these expired on 15 December 2014). In fact, I think this might reasonably be narrowed to those held by Rodman & Renshaw; they held 87,500 warrants with that expiration date.
I'd agree that you'd need to be a glutton for punishment to try to short this now; we may differ as to the reasons.
For those interested, thought I'd post some production numbers for Ohio shale gas producers. These figures are derived from quarterly operating data published by the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, and may be obtained freely from their site. Production figures below represent averaged Mcf per diem. 4th Quarter 2014 isn't yet available, but should be sometime in February.
Period Wells Mcf/Group Mcf/Well
1Q13 80 92,181 1,152
2Q13 139 165,551 1,191
3Q13 234 365,575 1,562
4Q13 335 468,748 1,399
1Q14 416 748,155 1,798
2Q14 501 975,854 1,948
3Q14 673 1,434,972 2,132
It would appear that the reports of LDK's demise are much exaggerated (at least with respect to their Chinese opreating entities).
Notwithstanding that they managed to stiff all their offshore noteholders, and their U.S. ADR shares need a stepladder to stay up on a dime, the Xinyu government (and, presumably, the China Development Bank, amongst others) is evidently STILL propping up the corpse. I see this week that they announced the completion of their hydrochlorination facility, so either they're going to resume production, or that particular, government-supported "winner" is merely an ongoing public works project to assure full employment in Jiangxi.
"The article posted by Chaz seem to be relaxing or redefining these restrictions. Is that correct?"
To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure. I'm always very cautious about numbers from Chinese articles rendered by "Googlish"; I've seen some very conspicuously incorrect placement or omission altogether of decimal points, particularly. In Chaz's article for example, a peasant digging in a hillside could likely produce more than 90 tons annual production, so I suspect the original Chinese was 90,000, and the Chinese "thousand" character ignored by the translation engine.
If you look through articles on the subject (small mine regulation / closing) on the China Coal Resource site, you'll find a number of pieces on the subject from 2011 forward; many provinces mention either 60,000 or 90,000 tons annually as the lower benchmark, so I'm guessing that was the case here, as well.
Just based on my own observation, it appears that Chinese provincial, or even local, officials exercise a considerable amount of autonomy, regardless whether it''s intended to be that way by the Central government. I recall a couple of years ago that the Central government was trying to let market forces take their course to thin out the photovoltaic industry, but local officials particularly persisted in propping up otherwise-untenable firms, until we eventually saw the result-companies like Suntech and LDK literally bankrupted overnight. Seems to me that controlling the provincial and local governments is akin to herding cats.
Here's a similar article from around this time last year regarding mine consolidation efforts in Shaanxi (from "China Coal Resource" English site):
"Northwestern China’s Shaanxi province would shut down more small coal mines, while placing stricter restrictions on approving new coal mines and capacity expansion, media reported, citing the provincial government.
All the small coal mines that fail to meet relevant government requirements would be closed, according to a statement released by the provincial government.
This would include small coal mines that have annual production capacity below 90,000 tonnes and fail to meet safety standards, or are ordered to suspend for rectification but continuing production, or expand operation into areas unapproved by the government.
Some mines that have been suspended for rectification since 2011 but still fail to meet relevant standards by June 2014 would also be closed.
Furthermore, consolidated coal mines that fail to finish technical upgrading within the specified deadline will be closed.
Shaanxi would also implement stricter restrictions on approval of new coal mines from 2014. All coal mines with production capacity lower than 300,000 tonnes per year will not be approved by the authority, and those with coal and gas outburst should have a production capacity of 900,000 tonnes and above."
Note that "coal and gas outburst" refers to a phenomenon wherein coal, rock, and gas are expelled at great force by a combination of gas pressure and tectonic stresses in the coal / rock strata, a distinct process from a pyrotechnic explosion of gas or coal dust.
In this context, the article reads more like a risk-benefit formula to limit exploitation of outburst-prone seams to those offering very high productive potential.
Well, their 10-K for 2014 is due either on 16 March or 31 March, depending on whether they're still held to be an Accelerated Filer or are now on the "Standard" (non-accelerated) filing calendar.
Happy New Year, all!
I see that the 2015 edition of the Consumer Electronics Show is scheduled to open next week (6 January, to be precise).
Highpower International (HPJ) has already announced their attendance (South Hall 4-booth 35621).
Anyone know where ABAT's booth might be?
The SEC revoked China Integrated Energy (CBEH) effective today (see Release 34-73917). According to the release, CBEH did not file a petition for review of the initial decision of 3 November.