By my Elliott count of AAPL
-wave A down started 4/10/2012 from $628
-wave B up stated 5/18/2012 from $430
-wace C down started from $700
Wave C down should have 5 subwaves, and if you identify the gap on 1/24/2013 as 3 of 3 down,
then it is quite easy to count 4 subwaves completed.
If wave (5) of C will be equal to wave (1) of C (which is a common relationship)
then (5) should be $170 long, started down on 3/25/2013, from $470,
and should end at $300.
This will be the first really good buying opportunity.
Since the last down waves usually have 5 subwaves,
usually form a falling wedge,
it should be easy to follow this "very pessimistic" scenario.
ING price started up in May last year, and looks like doing the same thing again this year.
Last year the price started at $6 and finished at 10.5 at yearend;
since then ING corrected the rally by FIBO 38%.
If we are in longerterm, like in a 10 year uptrend,
(I really think we are, after almost 7 years of downward correction),
then by the end of 2013 we should see ING price to hit $13-14.
This is the point when ALL remaining weak hands will sell,
and in 2014 ING will break above $14. And should march ahead up by $3-4/year, for 10 years.
Most of us strongly hope the new management team will be able to perform MUCH better
than the incompetent Jan's team did in the last 4 years.
ING dutifully followed the EU approval directive and conditions (which by the way, well, actually was more like punishment, for the liquidity crunch and Dutch state loan, at the bottom of the 2008 crisis) to clean its business portfolio, and ING completed a lot of forced sells of noncore business units all over the world.
ING sold in this last 5 years into a very weak demand for bank/insurance businesses almost all of its noncore businesses at an average of less than book price by now.
This process added to and improved ING's central treasury's liquidity, provided time to restructure, rethink core business strategy. BUT this period is over after 5 years, this ING does not need any more. It needs something else.
As the price for the so-called help, the forced sells destroyed real business value for ING shareholders, prevented to develop and destroyed almost all growth paths available for ING, at home and on emerging markets. ING still keeps paying a huge price for state loan in a zero interest rate environment.
One more that kind of bailout, and ING will collapse under the weight of outside "help".
Lets face facts: at the end, this was not help. This was max. a well-intended idea with VERY BAD final results. The end result was much closer to a bank robbery, orchestrated by EU, institutionalized by EU conditions. This destroyed tens of billions (most probably over $40B!) real value. Filled the coffers of the buyers of sold units, the state, and helped win IPO buyers at rock-bottom prices.
No wonder here: every time a state of superstate EU mixes into business, it destroys value, and the real effect is opposite to what was intended.
This crazy silliness MUST stop NOW.
A possible simple explanation might be that NBG management wants to keep the bank private .
To be on the safe side, they intentionally underpriced the new issue in order to attract a lot of private money, including hedge funds to balance state funds.
And, oh, if you was in their place, wouldn't you want to attract lost friendly investors, who also might get bridge loans to buy up the bank shares on the cheap.