Too many conflicts of interest. AGP is a pipe dream.
This baby is toast. Interest expense is eating up half, yes half, or Ebitda. Production is declining quarter over quarter due to decreased maintenance capital spending and they have very few assets that provide a decent IRR at current prices.
Cohen should have rolled the GP into ARP when they sold APL to Targa but he got greedy.
Turn out the lights, the party is over.
Cohen drove this baby right into the ground. I will be shocked if we don't see "going concern" status change at ATLS.
The real question is how long can they stave off bankruptcy?
It is Sunoco, not Sunocal. It's a drop-down, not a hand-me-down, and it was from ETP, not EEP.
EEP and MEP are affiliated and MEP is likely to implode and be cast astray from EEP.
The warning signs have been flashing for the past 2-3 years. Management booted Kolja Rockov out, if that didn't wake you up, nothing would.
The money should go to the creditors, not investors. That is the hierarchy of the capital structure. Even within the creditors, many of them must wait for the banks and senior secured holders.
Linn investors are going to get a big fat zero, and no amount of letters to a judge will change that.
Your world view is very flawed. Many on this board, myself included, were telling people to get out as far back as a year ago. People convince themselves that chasing yield is worth it. They convince themselves that they know more than the street.
Many MLPs and E&Ps with debt will survive, in fact, many will even thrive. ARP is poorly managed, has very poor leadership. Cohen is a senile old clown but make no mistake, I bet you a dollar he ends up holding assets post bankruptcy. He'll find a way to weasel control of the private drilling partnerships, Lightfoot etc.
MMLP management admitted that the contracts at Cardinal that are rolling off are being renewed at lower rates. The B of A analyst you mention also showed 2017 ebitda lower than 2016.
Where is MMLP growing? What plan do they have to appreciably grow ebitda and lower leverage?
My thoughts are that Howard is a home run for Alinda, it is growing and has some projects to export into Mexico (Enlink has some projects with them). RIGS is a disaster due to falling volumes from the Haynesville, this is based on the fact that Regency (now part of ETP) owned the other half and as I recall, only the MVC (minimum volume commitments) were saving them. With the emerging deeper plays, it might recover. Note that the Haynesville still has a decent number of rigs, only exceeded by Marcellus/Utica as I recall. I do not know about Nortex, but HFOTCo has an excellent ship channel location, almost as good Bostco. I think Alinda had designs of using MMLP as a drop-down vehicle, but perhaps changed their minds. When the transaction happened, it seemed like MMLP was partnering up with a strong supporter, but ultimately nothing has really transpired.
I addressed the natural gas storage issues at SeekingAlpha. Some of the other posters seemed to insinuate that storage wasn't a concern and upon me mentioning Buckeye's Lodi facility, Niska and Crestwoods Tres Palacios facility, I was greeted with rebuttals of LNG and Mexico exports and rising power generation demand. The prolific nature of the shale plays has shifted the supply basins and also brought the overall value of natural gas down as well as the seasonal (summer to winter) spread. Storage contracts from times when gas was $4.50/mcf make little sense when gas is $1.80 Henry Hub and lean E&P companies LOE and SG&A costs are $1.20/mcf. Margins are getting squeezed. The oversupply we have means less storage is needed because it is being exported to Mexico or via LNG and not stored for domestic winter heating use. This is one of the after effects of the paradigm shift of shale gas. An industry has been turned on its head, just like LNG import facilities are being converted to liquefaction facilities, it was not foreseen 5-10 years ago. MMLP has a few years as the contracts are staggered at Monroe, Cardinal etc, but DCF is declining and will likely continue to decline in the gas storage busienss and leverage is increasing and MRMC is NOT a strong GP. If they were strong, they would not have divested 50% of the IDRs (the golden goose) to Alinda.
As for overpaying, yes, but also, as I mentioned on SA, they overpaid to gain control of the cash flow. When they had the Redbird JV, they had project level debt that prohibited cash distributions. Once they rolled it into the fold and moved the debt up to the parent, they could start taking meaningful distributions.
I think in 2016 we see fairly significant disposals of marine assets and would not be surprised to see WLPG divested.
It is time for management to stop jeopardizing the long term viability of the company for short term gains.
"I think some are putting a bit too much emphasis on MMLP debt ratio."
In good times, no one cares about debt. When capital markets lock up, when commodity prices fall and the "easy" money starts going away, the market becomes far more discerning of balance sheet strength, counterparty exposure, stability of cash flows, commodity price exposure.
The market looks at MMLP and MRMC and sees, high leverage at both entities, falling DCF at the MLP, unknown cash flow stability at MRMC, a relationship in which MRMC needs the cash from MMLP to build assets, yet MMLP doesn't have the cash to purchase the assets from MRMC. It's really an ugly situation that management continues to ignore.
Alinda has a very large Fuel Oil Terminal in Houston. The asphalt project that Martin is pursuing is an organic growth project, but as has been previously mentioned, it is likely to be financed at the MRMC level (again, $20-$30 million range).
I do however expect MMLP to be active in divesting assets, especially their idle and low performing offshore marine assets.
For reference, the Houston Fuel Oil Terminal Company assets are likely worth $500-$750 million, or about the current market cap of MMLP. Alinda passed on their opportunity to drop it down into MMLP a couple of years ago, when MMLP was sailing high and the cost of equity capital was realistic.
Now, MMLP must pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. It won't be easy. DCF is headed down in 2016 and leverage is headed up (absent divestitures). Some management teams never learn. On the other hand, look at Magellan. They have no need to issue equity, have strong coverage and low leverage. They have one of the lowest costs of equity capital in the business. It's a classic case of the rich get richer. They are funding growth with surplus DCF and modest borrowings.
Running with barely 1.0x coverage year to year and kicking the can down the road will eventually catch up with MMLP. Their leverage must eventually be addressed and suspect that when they have to roll over their notes in a few years, that they will see the light.