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Signature Group Holdings, Inc. Message Board

stakeholder_9999 6 posts  |  Last Activity: Sep 11, 2014 11:07 PM Member since: Aug 12, 1999
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  • stakeholder_9999 stakeholder_9999 Sep 11, 2014 11:07 PM Flag

    Responsibility for Misinterpretation of the Negative Pressure Test

    iii. 253. BP was responsible for designing the procedures for the negative pressure test, supervising the test, and ultimately determining whether the test was a success.

  • stakeholder_9999 stakeholder_9999 Sep 11, 2014 10:33 PM Flag

    252. If the negative pressure test had been correctly interpreted, the blowout, explosion, fire, and oil spill would have been averted. Consequently, the Court finds that the misinterpretation of the negative pressure test was a substantial cause of the blowout, explosion, fire, and oil spill.

  • stakeholder_9999 stakeholder_9999 Sep 11, 2014 10:18 PM Flag

    BP's Well Site Leader had the ultimate decision on the negative pressure test.

    255. Randy Ezell, Transocean’s senior toolpusher on the HORIZON (who was off duty at the
    time of the blowout) testified that it was typical for the on-duty BP Well Site Leader and the on-duty Transocean toolpusher to discuss the results of a negative pressure test, but that “it was BP’s well, and he [the BP Well Site Leader] had the final say [as to whether the negative
    pressure test was successful or not]. . . . He [the BP Well Site Leader] had the ultimate decision, but we had stop-work authority if we saw something wasn’t correct.”95

  • stakeholder_9999 stakeholder_9999 Sep 11, 2014 10:08 PM Flag

    ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? .

    285. BP’s Accident Investigation Report stated that “the investigation team could find no evidence that such a phenomenon is possible, leaving the 1,400 psi unexplained unless it was caused by pressure from the reservoir.”108

    286. Five days after the blowout, Well Site Leader Bob Kaluza sent an e-mail to BP personnel that provided a detailed explanation as to how the “bladder effect” could have created the anomalous pressure reading. Patrick O’Byran, BP’s Vice President of Drilling and Completions for the Gulf of Mexico at the time (and who, coincidentally, was on the HORIZON when the explosions occurred), responded to this explanation by typing:

    ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? .
    . .
    followed by roughly another 500 question marks. During trial Mr. O’Byran explained, “[A]s I sit here today, I don’t understand what Mr. Kaluza was trying to define, and this [the question-mark-only response] is what we have in front of us today.”109

  • stakeholder_9999 stakeholder_9999 Sep 11, 2014 9:57 PM Flag

    BP's statement is patently false !!!!

    278. It is also noted that BP’s Accident Investigation Report did not mention the 8:52 p.m. phone call between Vidrine and Hafle, and in fact states, “The investigation team has found no evidence that the rig crew or well site leaders consulted anyone outside their team about the pressure abnormality.”104 This statement is patently false. As reflected in the BP investigators’ notes and as members of the investigation team admitted at trial, the BP investigation team was aware of the 8:52 p.m. phone call.

    531. For these reasons, the Court concludes that a corporation is vicariously liable under the CWA’s enhanced penalty provision for the gross negligence and/or willful misconduct of its employees. Consequently, the Court need not determine whether BPXP authorized or ratified the conduct, or whether Vidrine and Hafle (or any other BP employee) were “managerial agents,” or any other attribution standard that may apply under general maritime law, “traditional” common law, or any other law or jurisdiction.

  • BP found Gross negligent - but then why no punitive damages?

    275. Furthermore, it is inexplicable that Hafle did not take further action given that he believed the design of the cement job was “on [the] ragged edge” and that BP would get a “shittie” cement job. 102 Mr. Hafle also knew of the problems BP encountered with converting the float collar and the anomalous data that followed.

    276. But even if Hafle lacked context, Don Vidrine did not. The Well Site Leader already had firsthand knowledge of the negative pressure test that he himself approved an hour before. Furthermore, Vidrine stated in post-incident interviews that the negative pressure test results looked “squirrely” to him and that he was “concerned” about the pressure on the drill pipe. 103 If these statements accurately represent Vidrine’s beliefs on April 20, 2010, then when Hafle provided the information Vidrine already was obligated to know as a matter of fundamental well control—“you can’t have pressure on the drill pipe and zero pressure on the kill line in a test that’s properly lined up”—Vidrine should not have hesitated to order the Transocean drill crew to stop the displacement, shut in the well, and redo the negative pressure test.

    277. However, Vidrine did not order another negative pressure test after the phone call. Nor does any evidence indicate that Vidrine discussed the phone call with the Transocean crew. Instead, at 9:14 p.m. Mr. Vidrine affirmatively ordered that the pumps—which had stopped at 9:08 p.m. so a sheen test could be performed—be restarted and that displacement continue. He did this with the critical information the BP Senior Drilling Engineer had provided to him only minutes earlier.


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