Bill Ackman Comments on Hilton Worldwide Holdings
- By Holly LaFon
During the quarter we exited our previously undisclosed passive investment in Hilton Worldwide Holdings (HLT) at a 32% profit versus our cost over an 11-month holding period. Our approach to disclosure is to provide to you the information that we would want if our positions were reversed; that is, if you were the investment manager and we were the client, with the caveat that we do not disclose information that would create a competitive disadvantage for the funds unless we are legally required to do so. We did not disclose our investment in Hilton until we disposed of it for this reason.
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The intrinsic value of HLT
Hilton is an asset-light, high-margin, fee-based business that primarily franchises and manages hotel properties under more than a dozen hotel brands, including Hilton, Hampton, DoubleTree, and Hilton Garden Inn. Hilton has organically established (i.e., not through acquisition) an industry-leading global pipeline of franchised hotel rooms, which amounts to nearly 40% of its existing room count and should support a high level of capital-light growth for years into the future. Hilton's extensive and growing network of brands and properties offers a significant and self-reinforcing value proposition to both guests and hotel owners, which creates a strong competitive moat around the business. For guests, Hilton provides a consistent and reliable experience in a variety of destinations at different price points and an attractive loyalty program which features enhanced customer service, amenities, and awards. For hotel owners, Hilton provides access to its more than 60 million loyalty program members, scaled marketing programs, reservation and IT systems, and supply chain purchasing power.
Prior to our investment in the summer of 2016, the company announced it would spin off its owned hotel and timeshare businesses, which we believed would highlight the significant value of its remaining franchised and management business. We have long admired Hilton's business and had followed its progress since the IPO at the end of 2013. Despite strong business performance since the IPO, which included 15% unit growth, more than 30% EBITDA growth, and more than 70% free cash flow per share growth, Hilton's share price had increased by a total of only about 10%. We believed that two key investor concerns were weighing on the share price: a potential downturn in the lodging cycle and the potential competitive threat from Airbnb.
To determine the risk of a downturn in the lodging cycle, we undertook an extensive analysis of the previous cycles over the past thirty years. We observed that in the three prior downturns (1991, 2001-2002, and 2008-2009), RevPAR (a measure of same-store sales for the lodging industry) averaged positive annual growth over the five-year period starting just prior to the downturn. While we recognized that it was possible that RevPAR might decline for a period of time, we believed it likely that RevPAR would average positive growth over a three-to-five year time horizon. Moreover, we believed the capital-light unit growth embedded in Hilton's hotel pipeline would more than offset a potential decline in RevPAR and allow for continued annual revenue and EBITDA growth.
To understand the potential competitive risk regarding Airbnb, we reviewed the publicly available data and research on the company and we interviewed dozens of hotel owners, travel agents, lodging industry consultants, and employees of Airbnb and other vacation-rental competitors. We concluded that Hilton's business model was unlikely to face a meaningful threat from Airbnb as the two businesses tend to compete for different customer sets. The vast majority of Hilton's revenue derives from short-stay business travelers who value the consistent experience, amenities, and loyalty program that Hilton's brands provide, whereas the typical Airbnb customer is a leisure traveler who seeks out unique and local accommodations for a lengthier stay. Furthermore, a large portion of Hilton's portfolio is based in suburban markets where there is currently limited Airbnb inventory.
In the beginning of 2017, Hilton spun off its owned hotel and timeshare businesses. After the spin, Hilton's share price began a steady upward ascent as the company continued to report strong business performance and initiated a meaningful share repurchase program. We recently exited our position to allocate capital to other opportunities and achieved a 32% total return on our investment in less than a year. Hilton did not make a more meaningful impact on overall Company performance because its rapid rise at the time of our investment limited the position size to ~5% of the portfolio.
Hilton embodied many of the characteristics that we have identified in other successful investments: a high-quality business with a significant opportunity for capital-light growth, a best-in-class management team, sponsorship from a well-regarded sponsor (Blackstone), and a built-in catalyst, the spinoffs, to unlock shareholder value. While we generally prefer to allocate our capital to activist situations, if we can find a high quality business run by a highly capable management team, and there is appropriate shareholder oversight in the boardroom, we are open to passive investments.
From Bill Ackman (Trades, Portfolio)'s second quarter 2017 shareholder letter.
This article first appeared on GuruFocus.
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The intrinsic value of HLT
