|Bid||20.10 x 0|
|Ask||20.11 x 0|
|Day's Range||20.00 - 20.38|
|52 Week Range||13.10 - 25.31|
|Beta (5Y Monthly)||0.94|
|PE Ratio (TTM)||14.05|
|Earnings Date||Aug 20, 2021|
|Forward Dividend & Yield||0.18 (0.90%)|
|Ex-Dividend Date||May 14, 2021|
|1y Target Est||11.97|
Announcement of Periodic Review: Moody's announces completion of a periodic review of ratings of Ping An Bank Co., LtdGlobal Credit Research - 09 Apr 2021Hong Kong, April 09, 2021 -- Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") has completed a periodic review of the ratings of Ping An Bank Co., Ltd and other ratings that are associated with the same analytical unit. The review was conducted through a portfolio review discussion held on 1 April 2021 in which Moody's reassessed the appropriateness of the ratings in the context of the relevant principal methodology(ies), recent developments, and a comparison of the financial and operating profile to similarly rated peers. Since 1 January 2019, Moody's practice has been to issue a press release following each periodic review to announce its completion.This publication does not announce a credit rating action and is not an indication of whether or not a credit rating action is likely in the near future.
Several Chinese mid-sized commercial banks have posted growth in net profit recently, on the back of a strong recovery in lockstep with the country's economy in the fourth quarter. Ping An Bank, China Merchants Bank and China Citic Bank have reported net profit growth of between 2 and 4 per cent for the full year. While the results of China Merchants Bank and China Citic Bank are preliminary, they provide an early glimpse of the health of their business before finalised results are released in late March, Ping An Bank's figures are final. These positive results have bucked the trend, because net profit for the banking industry as a whole, based on preliminary data, is expected to drop by 1.8 per cent for the full year of 2020, according to Liang Tao, the vice-chairman of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission. The NPL ratio for the sector stood at 1.92 per cent as of the end of 2020, slightly down from the 1.94 per cent - a 10-year high - recorded in June. Get the latest insights and analysis from our Global Impact newsletter on the big stories originating in China. This is because some analysts and bank officials expect profitability at China's big state-owned banks to be weighed down by sour loans in the aftermath of the coronavirus pandemic. The country's banking sector is differentiated into the larger state-owned commercial banks and the smaller joint-stock banks. Joint-stock lenders such as Ping An Bank are not directly state-owned and count corporations as their shareholders. According to estimates gathered by Bloomberg, net profit for the full year at China Construction Bank, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Agricultural Bank of China is expected to drop by between 6 and 8 per cent to 249.4 billion yuan, 169.9 billion yuan, 287.9 billion yuan and 194.7 billion yuan, respectively. China Merchants Bank's asset quality improved notably in the fourth quarter, Morgan Stanley analysts say. Photo: Bloomberg alt=China Merchants Bank's asset quality improved notably in the fourth quarter, Morgan Stanley analysts say. Photo: Bloomberg Ping An Bank, which reported its result on Monday evening, said its full-year profit had risen by 2.6 per cent. The bank, which is controlled by Ping An Insurance (Group), the country's largest insurer by market cap, said its net profit rose to 28.9 billion yuan (US$4.8 billion) from 28.2 billion yuan a year ago. Its non-performing loan (NPL) ratio also improved, from 1.32 per cent in the third quarter to 1.18 per cent for the full year. Retail-focused Ping An Bank' bottom line was bolstered by a strong rebound in the fourth quarter, particularly in its fee income business, analysts said. This helped it overcome an 18 per cent increase in loan loss provisioning to 70 billion yuan, and to beat analysts' expectations. Last month, preliminary figures provided by China Merchants Bank showed that its net profit rose 4.8 per cent year on year to 97.3 billion yuan from 92.9 billion yuan, also due to strong revenue growth in the fourth quarter. Its NPL ratio declined from 1.13 per cent in the third quarter to 1.07 per cent for the full year. Liang Tao, the vice-chairman of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission. Photo: Handout alt=Liang Tao, the vice-chairman of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission. Photo: Handout "[China Merchants Bank's] asset quality improved notably in the fourth quarter," Morgan Stanley analysts including Richard Xu and Daniel Fang said in a recent note. They said that "asset quality on credit cards has likely stabilised in the fourth quarter, in our view". China Citic Bank's full-year net profit also rose, climbing 2 per cent to about 49 billion yuan from 48 billion yuan during the same period a year ago, on lower provisions the bank set aside for bad loans, analysts said. This article originally appeared in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), the most authoritative voice reporting on China and Asia for more than a century. For more SCMP stories, please explore the SCMP app or visit the SCMP's Facebook and Twitter pages. Copyright © 2021 South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved. Copyright (c) 2021. South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved.
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- In 2018, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited one of Tsinghua Unigroup Co.’s mega memory-chip factories in Wuhan, he said that semiconductor processing is the heart of a nation’s manufacturing industry. Well, that heart just skipped a beat.Unigroup, a commercial arm of the prestigious Tsinghua University, Xi’s alma mater, missed a payment on a 1.3 billion yuan ($198 million) note Monday, adding to a lengthening list of SOE defaults. Investors are now left guessing: What type of SOEs will Beijing support? How much money can we claw back in the event of a default?It will be a game of hide and seek. There’s now a deepening suspicion that SOEs will transfer good assets out before creditors drag them to court. A few days before its default, Unigroup pledged a 16.14% stake in smart-card chip designer Unigroup Guoxin Microelectronics Co., worth about $1.4 billion, to Bank of Beijing for a 10 billion yuan credit line. But that credit line had already been signed at the beginning of the year, and Unigroup reportedly didn't receive fresh loans in return. This echoes similar moves from two large regional SOEs. And where’s all the cash these companies claimed on their balance sheets? Yongcheng Coal & Electricity Holding Group Co.’s default on a 1 billion yuan note on Nov. 10 came as a surprise. As of June, it sat on close to 50 billion yuan of cash; only 360 million yuan was restricted as term deposits with Ping An Bank Co., the company disclosed a month ago. In late October, Yongcheng raised a 1 billion yuan three-year note, with a AAA-rating from a local agency. So traditional credit analysis, such as looking at whether a company has enough cash to cover short-term debt, doesn’t work. Investors all know SOEs’ ubiquitous AAA ratings are a joke. In the past, they tried to differentiate bond issuers by their geographical locations or the nature of their business operations. Companies from impoverished provinces that have a track record of defaults, such as Liaoning, Tianjin or Qinghai, were shunned. Meanwhile, SOEs that controlled assets with national strategic value were sought after. The latest wave of defaults proved them wrong. Yongcheng, which has 24.4 billion yuan of bonds outstanding, is an SOE from the fiscally healthy Henan province. Meanwhile, Unigroup controls one of the Chinese semiconductor industry’s two crown jewels: Its flash-memory chip factory in Wuhan is cutting-edge.One question is why Beijing is allowing SOE defaults now. Bear in mind, Xi always wanted to carry out this painful corporate deleveraging campaign. He started in late 2017, but got derailed by President Donald Trump’s trade war and then the Covid-19 outbreak. Now, both roadblocks are gone. From a politician’s eye, defaults can just be a quicker way to enforce SOE reform. As long as quality assets are hidden away, companies can go into bankruptcy court and emerge leaner. Local courts are part of the government, anyhow. Debtholders will just have to nurse their wounds. Last Friday, when Unigroup was proposing to extend its due date, parent Tsinghua Holdings’ Chairman Long Dawei said “Unigroup is not standing alone” as a show of confidence, Debtwire reported. That might be. But these SOE defaults and restructurings are also leaving investors isolated and in the dark, with no faith or assets to hold onto. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Shuli Ren is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asian markets. She previously wrote on markets for Barron's, following a career as an investment banker, and is a CFA charterholder.For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinionSubscribe now to stay ahead with the most trusted business news source.©2020 Bloomberg L.P.