|Bid||0.0000 x 0|
|Ask||0.0000 x 0|
|Day's Range||0.9571 - 0.9571|
|52 Week Range||0.5230 - 1.1800|
|Beta (5Y Monthly)||1.42|
|PE Ratio (TTM)||N/A|
|Forward Dividend & Yield||N/A (N/A)|
|Ex-Dividend Date||Jul 21, 2014|
|1y Target Est||N/A|
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- The rise of social media has turned the fear of missing out — or FOMO — into a widespread anxiety. Those jitters may now strike parts of Europe’s banking sector with renewed anticipation for a wave of much-needed consolidation.An unsolicited bid by Intesa Sanpaolo SpA for Unione di Banche Italiane SpA on Monday night has triggered hopes of a process that would help Europe’s financial system reduce its excess capacity. It is not yet clear whether the combination will actually go ahead. But the offer raises two important questions. The first is whether any future mergers and acquisitions would proceed purely along national lines, contributing to the balkanization of the euro-area financial industry. The second is whether they would leave out weaker lenders, testing the appetite of increasingly powerless politicians for outright liquidations.The surprise 4.9 billion-euro ($5.3 billion) all-share approach appears to have received an approving nod from the European Central Bank. Roberto Gualtieri, Italy’s finance minister, said he is in principle in favor of deals aimed at consolidating the market. It’s not hard to see why: Changes in consumers’ behavior, competition from nimbler fintech companies and the prolonged era of low-interest rates have put Europe’s banking sector under immense pressure. And while lenders have made enormous progress in dealing with a gigantic mountain of non-performing loans, too few of them have exited the markets, unlike what’s happened in the U.S. What’s more, M&A deals have been far too rare: The Intesa-Ubi deal would be the largest acquisition in Europe in over a decade.Policy makers should hold back on the prosecco, however. For a start, the quest for a significant cross-border merger remains elusive in spite of efforts to create the conditions for that to happen. In the aftermath of the euro zone crisis, member states created a “banking union” to sever the link between a national government and its domestic financial system. The European Central Bank has since taken over as the main banking supervisor in the currency area, and large failing banks are in principle dealt with using a single rule book. However, banks continue to look domestically when they seek to expand, shunning the potential benefit of geographic diversification.It would be easy to blame executives for their lack of vision as they choose to stick to their own backyard. Intesa, with its 11.8 million Italian customers, is doing just that. In 2017, it took over the assets of Veneto Banca SpA and Banca Popolare di Vicenza SpA, two mid-sized Italian lenders, as they entered liquidation. The bank will now further increase its exposure to Italy — a country with an enormous public debt and a near-stagnating economy.However, bankers continue to pursue domestic mergers because they are more likely to produce the kind of cost synergies needed to justify a combination. Add to that the lack of a euro-region-wide joint deposit guarantee scheme, and regulatory uncertainty for deals across national borders, and you can see why the euro zone policy makers also have some soul-searching to do.While they’re searching, they would do well to consider the other unresolved issue in all of this: the future of the region’s weaker banks. Ubi is a comparatively healthy lender, which explains its appeal to Intesa. That should give pause to politicians and regulators, who may be expecting “white knights” to take over the more problematic banks. In the case of Italy, the list includes Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, which is currently under state control but should in principle be privatized next year; and Banca Carige SpA and Banca Popolare di Bari SCpa, where successive governments have arranged stopgap solutions involving a mixture of private and public money.The mooted merger between Intesa and Ubi shows that even if a wave of consolidation were to come to Europe, it could simply pass by those in the worst shape. The current EU framework makes it very hard for a government to prop up an ailing lender indefinitely. At some point politicians may have to consider whether some banks may simply have to fail — even if this carries a cost for shareholders and bondholders.Consolidation will not solve all of Europe’s banking problems. Whether they care about the creation of a true “banking union” or simply about the future of troubled lenders, policy makers should worry about those that are likely to miss out — and do something about it.To contact the author of this story: Ferdinando Giugliano at firstname.lastname@example.orgTo contact the editor responsible for this story: Melissa Pozsgay at email@example.comThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Bloomberg LP and its owners.Ferdinando Giugliano writes columns on European economics for Bloomberg Opinion. He is also an economics columnist for La Repubblica and was a member of the editorial board of the Financial Times.For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinionSubscribe now to stay ahead with the most trusted business news source.©2020 Bloomberg L.P.
Announcement of Periodic Review: Moody's announces completion of a periodic review of ratings of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. Paris, February 17, 2020 -- Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") has completed a periodic review of the ratings of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. and other ratings that are associated with the same analytical unit. The review was conducted through a portfolio review in which Moody's reassessed the appropriateness of the ratings in the context of the relevant principal methodology(ies), recent developments, and a comparison of the financial and operating profile to similarly rated peers.
Italy's UBI is set to extend an insurance partnership with Cattolica for a limited time, sources familiar with the matter said, delaying longer-term decisions while it waits to see how consolidation among mid-sized banks plays out. Italy's fifth-largest bank is seen playing a leading role in a new round of M&A between second-tier lenders as they grapple with negative rates, a stagnating economy and a digital revolution in the industry. UBI had been planning to reorganise its insurance operations, valued at 1 billion euros, under a new three-year plan it will unveil next month and had been looking for a new partner.
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- The troubled Italian lender Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA took another big step in its long path to redemption last week by selling subordinated debt for the second time in six months. An 8% coupon is expensive for the world’s oldest bank, but it can hardly complain given its years of troubles.Even though the yield is enticing, investors are still taking a gamble. They will doubtless have been encouraged by expectations that the Italian state will have their backs. Rome owns 68% of Paschi and there’s a fourth bailout on its way for the lender.The general environment for investing in Italian banks is a bit better too. Another lender, Banco BPM SpA, issued some perpetual hybrid debt on Tuesday. Paschi is deeply into junk territory yet it managed to raise a chunky 400 million euros ($444 million). This was one-third bigger than a similar 10-year Tier 2 issue in July, and at a much lower cost than the 10.5% coupon it had to offer then. It was more than twice subscribed and the yield has tightened modestly since launch.Monte Paschi’s debt coordinators showed a fair amount of skill with last week’s sale, amid another record start to bond issuance this year. Only days ago, the bank told shareholders it will have to take a big hit to profit after writing down deferred tax assets. Still, for Monte Paschi it’s very helpful that the state aid just keeps coming. The bet by bond investors that Rome will keep doing whatever it takes may be a winning one.Reeling from an acquisition that drained it of cash just as markets peaked in 2007, Paschi has had to turn to its government three times already to replenish its capital as losses on bad loans piled up. The last round, in 2017, saw Italy effectively take over the lender while pledging to exit by 2021 under terms agreed with the European Union.The bank has made progress in cleaning up its balance sheet, but a ratio of non-performing loans of about 12.5% targeted for year-end and sluggish revenue render Paschi virtually untouchable for would-be partners. Luckily, as in the past, Italian taxpayers are on hand. Italy is in talks with Brussels to allow state-backed debt manager Amco to buy more than 10 billion euros of Paschi’s soured loans, a move that would reduce its bad debt ratio to below 5%, according to Morgan Stanley analysts.You can never be certain about Monte Paschi, a bank that hid losses with complex derivatives and was found by the European Central Bank to have inadequate governance and financial controls as recently as 2017. But another round of aid might make it look more attractive to rivals. Bond markets clearly find it palatable.To contact the authors of this story: Marcus Ashworth at firstname.lastname@example.orgElisa Martinuzzi at email@example.comTo contact the editor responsible for this story: James Boxell at firstname.lastname@example.orgThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of Bloomberg LP and its owners.Marcus Ashworth is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering European markets. He spent three decades in the banking industry, most recently as chief markets strategist at Haitong Securities in London.Elisa Martinuzzi is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering finance. She is a former managing editor for European finance at Bloomberg News.For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinionSubscribe now to stay ahead with the most trusted business news source.©2020 Bloomberg L.P.
Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") has upgraded to Aa3 from A1 the ratings assigned to the mortgage covered bonds issued by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.'s (the issuer, "MPS", deposits B1; adjusted baseline credit assessment b3; counterparty risk (CR) assessment Ba3(cr). For further information on the rating action taken by Moody's Financial Institutions Group, please refer to Moody's press release http://www.moodys.com/viewresearchdoc.aspx?docid=PR_416402. Moody's determines covered bond ratings using a two-step process: an expected loss analysis and a TPI framework analysis.
Moody's Investors Service (Moody's) today changed the outlook on the senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. (MPS) to positive from negative. Moody's upgraded the bank's standalone Baseline Credit Assessment (BCA) to b3 from caa1, upgraded the subordinated debt rating to Caa1 from Caa2, and affirmed the long-term senior unsecured debt and deposit ratings at Caa1 and B1 respectively. Moody's also upgraded the BCA of MPS Capital Services S.p.A. (MPS Capital Services) to b3 from caa1, reflecting Moody's view that this entity is Highly Integrated and Harmonized (HIH) with MPS and that its standalone characteristics have limited credit significance.
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- After the financial crisis, Europe’s political leaders put together a complex set of rules to make it harder for future governments to bail out banks. That system is looking so full of holes that one wonders what the point of it is.Two episodes in a fortnight show that taxpayers are still very much on the hook for the financial system’s losses. At the start of December, the European Commission gave a green light to the rescue of NordLB, a German savings bank, by the governments of Lower Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt; the protection scheme of the German savings bank sector also chipped in.Then on Sunday, Italy set aside 900 million euros ($1 bn) to recapitalize Banca del Mezzogiorno-Mediocredito Centrale (MCC), a state-owned bank, so that it can save a private regional lender, Banca Popolare di Bari SCpa. Brussels hasn’t yet cleared this rescue plan, but Rome is confident it will. In recent years, Italy has rescued Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA and Banca Carige SpA. In 2015, the German states Hamburg and Schleswig-Holstein helped HSH Nordbank. It wasn’t meant to be this way. Between October 2008 and December 2012, European Union governments spent nearly 600 billion euros on recapitalizing banks and other asset relief measures, according to the Commission. The subsequent anger of voters prompted politicians to agree on a single rulebook, putting strict limits on when a government can prop up an ailing lender. The so-called Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive says governments must generally impose losses on shareholders, bondholders and, in some cases, large depositors before they’re allowed to pour in public money.Some politicians have done everything they can to circumvent the rules. Italy is reluctant to inflict pain on local bondholders, who are often retail investors. In Germany, regional governments refuse to let their banks fail, preferring to fork out billions instead. So while the letter of the new rules still stands, politicians have devised so many exemptions that their spirit is gone.Take NordLB. The Commission argues that Germany’s regional governments will intervene with the same conditions as a private investor, which will ensure no distortion of competition. Yet the rescue, including a 2.8-billion euro cash injection and 800 million euros in guarantees, appears far more generous than what was on available from the market.Meanwhile, Italy’s government says MCC will intervene in Banca Popolare di Bari alongside the voluntary arm of the country’s deposit guarantee scheme; and that this proves the rescue is being done under market conditions. However, this interbank scheme has acted repeatedly as a de facto lender of last resort to banks. It’s highly doubtful that any other investors would help out like this.This isn’t to say the last decade’s banking reforms were entirely in vain. Since 2014 the European Central Bank has taken over from national watchdogs as the chief supervisor of the euro zone’s largest banks. (Unfortunately, less significant institutions such as Banca Popolare di Bari remain under local oversight). The ECB has its own problems — especially in terms of communication and transparency — but it’s usually a tougher policeman than many of its national counterparts.The bigger problem is that the euro zone’s “banking union” is still fragmented. The Single Resolution Board (SRB), a body within the banking union that’s in charge of winding down failing banks, has an excessively high bar for intervening. As a result, smaller and medium-sized banks are dealt with using a patchwork of national rules. Add to that the reluctance from politicians to let banks go bust and you can see why taxpayers routinely pick up the bill.It’s not too late to salvage the post-crisis reforms. A priority must be to harmonize national bankruptcy regimes, which provide endless loopholes to escape the region’s common rules. The SRB shouldn’t just intervene in the event of problems at the largest banks. Politicians should finally complete the banking union, creating a joint deposit guarantee scheme for the region. This would ensure that all depositors (up to 100,000 euros) face exactly the same risks, and end the increasingly varied national schemes.None of this will be possible unless politicians and supervisors agree they’re truly ready to impose losses on investors and let some banks go bust. Bailouts wash away past sins. For all the post-crisis backlash, this explains their enduring appeal.To contact the author of this story: Ferdinando Giugliano at email@example.comTo contact the editor responsible for this story: James Boxell at firstname.lastname@example.orgThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Ferdinando Giugliano writes columns on European economics for Bloomberg Opinion. He is also an economics columnist for La Repubblica and was a member of the editorial board of the Financial Times.For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion©2019 Bloomberg L.P.
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- As 2019 draws to a close, there’s more than a whiff of banking deregulation in the air. The U.S. has relaxed its lender stress tests and made it easier again for Wall Street to trade using its own funds. In Europe, capital requirements are being softened.The reining in of bank risk after the financial crisis is giving way to a loosening of the rules just as the desperation for yield makes banks more willing to gamble. This seems imprudent: Although banks are safer than they were before Lehman Brothers imploded, critical weaknesses remain.Sheila Bair was chair of the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. — the body that preserves confidence in the American banking system — from 2006 through 2011, and she’s a current board member at Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd. As such, she has a unique insight into how far lenders have changed. I interviewed her in Washington DC recently for a Bloomberg Storylines episode about Italy’s Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, “How a $450 Million Loss Was Made to Disappear.”In November, 13 bankers from Paschi, Deutsche Bank AG and Nomura Holdings Inc. were convicted for helping the Italian lender hide losses in 2008. It may be an old case but it still serves as a cautionary tale of how banks can massage their numbers.Crucially, as I discussed at length with Bair, banks’ accounts are still impenetrable and reforms have done little to improve transparency. Complex transactions can obfuscate lenders’ true financial health, while more detailed rules have made regulatory reporting and external scrutiny even harder.Here’s an edited transcript of our conversation:ELISA MARTINUZZI: Before Monte Paschi, Lehman Brothers had also used an accounting trick, “Repo 105,” to make its books look stronger. What have we learned from Lehman?SHEILA BAIR: The continued availability of accounting tricks to dress up your regulatory ratios and your public disclosures, I think. And it’s still going on.EM: How far has post-crisis regulation curtailed the banks’ capacity to work around the requirements?SB: Whether it’s [tackling the] accounting gimmicks people used to game their regulatory ratios or just more fundamentally how much capital and liquidity there is in this system, we’ve made them a little better. But we really haven’t made any kind of fundamental reforms.EM: How concerned should taxpayers be?SB: As a citizen worried about the stability of the economy, which relies on a stable financial system, I think people should still be concerned. There’s this kind of assumption that it’s yesterday’s news. And I think that’s probably ill-advised because I think there’s still some real fragility in the system.There’s too much complexity around the financial instruments that we tolerate on regulated banks, the exposures that they take. And frankly, culture too. I mean, do bank managers of integrity use derivatives to dress up their balance sheet or try to hide a risk and losses that they have? No, I don’t think good managers would do that. But there probably is still a culture problem too in the financial services industry that management will entertain strategies like that when they shouldn’t.EM: How has transparency around disclosures improved?SB: If anything, we’ve made it harder because it seems so many of the rules, especially around capital and liquidity are so complex to the extent investors or others — analysts, journalists — want to determine how good those rules are and how effectively banks are complying with those rules. I think the complexity really hinders that kind of outside discipline. It’s kind of an inside game now with the banks and their supervisors.EM: Where do you see systemic risk building up today? Is it away from the banking industry?SB: Nothing’s really outside the banking sector, because we [saw] during the subprime crisis too that all of these toxic mortgages were being passed on broadly to investors.EM: Are memories of the financial crisis fading?SB: It really distresses me, because having lived through that and thinking that we had learned our lesson, to see what’s going on now [simplifying and weakening the post-crisis rules] is just wrongheaded. The debate we should be having is what’s going to happen in the next year or two if the U.S. economy, or more likely the global economy, slides into recession; how well banks are prepared, should they be building a bit more of their capital cushion now?EM: Are you confident we won’t be seeing another Monte Paschi? SB: No, I'm not confident that we won't. I absolutely would say that I'm not confident we won't. No, no, no.To contact the author of this story: Elisa Martinuzzi at email@example.comTo contact the editor responsible for this story: James Boxell at firstname.lastname@example.orgThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Elisa Martinuzzi is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering finance. She is a former managing editor for European finance at Bloomberg News.For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion©2019 Bloomberg L.P.
If you're interested in Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. (BIT:BMPS), then you might want to consider its beta (a...
Italy is still in discussions with the European Commission on a plan to further rid Monte dei Paschi of problem loans, the CEO of the state-owned bank said on Monday after a newspaper reported that negotiations had fallen through. Sources have said the Italian Treasury is seeking to win EU approval for a plan that would allow Monte dei Paschi to cut 10 billion euros ($11 billion) in impaired loans without suffering losses. The plan would see a chunk of the bank's assets and liabilities transferred to state-owned bad loan manager AMCO.
An Italian court has convicted 13 former bankers from Deutsche Bank, Nomura and Monte dei Paschi di Siena over derivative deals that prosecutors say helped the Tuscan bank hide losses in one of the country's biggest financial scandals. Monte dei Paschi reached a settlement with the court over the case in 2016 at a cost of 10.6 million euros.
ROME/MILAN (Reuters) - Italy is in talks with the European Commission over a plan to rid state-owned Monte dei Paschi di Siena of around two thirds of its soured loans to pave the way for a sale of the bank, a source with direct knowledge of the situation said. Hurt by a pile of problem debts and a derivatives scandal, Monte dei Paschi was for years at the forefront of Italy's banking crisis until a bailout in 2017, which handed the state a 68% stake in the world's oldest lender. To reach that goal, the plan under discussion would see Monte dei Paschi spin off some 10 billion euros in impaired loans into a separate company that would then be merged with state-owned bad loan manager AMCO, the source said.
European shares staged a comeback from early losses on Tuesday as growth sectors led the charge, after Washington's move to delay tariffs on some Chinese goods provided a lift to battered global sentiment. The U.S. administration will delay imposing a 10% tariff on certain Chinese products, including laptops and cell phones, beyond September, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative said on Tuesday. A separate list also included some imports that would be exempted altogether from tariffs.
An Italian court on Tuesday acquitted Monte dei Paschi di Siena's former finance chief Gianluca Baldassari and 11 others of charges related to an alleged fraud scheme at the bank. Baldassarri, who worked at Monte dei Paschi from 2001 to 2012, was accused by prosecutors of running what became known as "the five percent gang", a group of people who prosecutors in the Tuscan city of Siena said demanded fixed fees for themselves for every financial transactions they managed to push through. The alleged fraud scheme was part of a wider scandal that rocked the world's oldest bank in 2013 and eventually led to it being rescued by the Italian state in 2017.
Monte dei Paschi di Siena said on Sunday it had been forced to end early a 10-year bad loan management contract so that it could have more freedom in selling off bad debts in a worsening economic environment. Monte dei Paschi had closed a year ago the sale of its bad loan management unit, dubbed Juliet, to asset manager Quaestio Holding and credit manager Cerved , signing a 10-year contract under which it paid fees for debt collection services. Monte dei Paschi said the penalty was fully offset by lower debt servicing fees in the years ahead.