|Bid||402.30 x 0|
|Ask||402.60 x 0|
|Day's Range||399.10 - 404.10|
|52 Week Range||199.00 - 428.70|
|Beta (3Y Monthly)||0.73|
|PE Ratio (TTM)||9.98|
|Forward Dividend & Yield||0.07 (1.63%)|
|1y Target Est||N/A|
When I visited WeWork’s San Francisco office a few years ago, I realized right away that there was nothing special about the company. It didn’t have any unique technology behind it; even the concept itself wasn’t unique. More importantly, it wasn’t clear to me why WeWork was valued as a tech company when, in fact, it just provides workspace for tech workers.
WeWork's decision to abandon its initial public offering and the resulting turmoil at the shared office space provider has created an opportunity for major competitor IWG , said IWG's founder and Chief Executive Mark Dixon. This contrasts with the large losses reported by WeWork in its filings for the IPO, which also triggered questions about whether its business model worked.
The high-profile start-up built its real estate portfolio with long-term leases. The problem is that WeWork’s customers are far less committed.
(Bloomberg) -- As WeWork contemplates listing on the public markets at a far lower valuation that previously expected, its biggest backer—Japan's SoftBank Group Corp.—is bracing for a potentially staggering loss, a stark reminder of the risks of an investing strategy that inflated startup valuations across Silicon Valley.SoftBank has a roughly 29% stake in the We Co., WeWork’s parent, said one executive at an analyst call on Wednesday, after the company plowed a total of $10.65 billion into the startup. The Tokyo conglomerate’s massive stake is a vote of confidence in the unprofitable company, which lost about $1.61 billion last year.Perhaps more than any other startup, WeWork has come to symbolize the brash investment style of SoftBank and its $100 billion Vision Fund, known for making huge bets on promising but unproven companies, and spurring others in the industry to follow suit to compete. The success or failure of WeWork’s initial public offering is likely to be read as a statement on the overall standing of SoftBank, the judgment of its executives and its ability to raise cash for future ventures.Now, SoftBank’s big bet may already be turning sour as WeWork mulls an IPO that would peg its worth at less than half its $47 billion valuation when SoftBank invested earlier this year. The New York-based company is now said to be considering a market debut at just $20 to $30 billion, fueling tensions among SoftBank employees. The WeWork IPO comes at a critical time for SoftBank, which is currently trying to convince investors to bankroll a second $108 billion iteration of its Vision Fund. The company is already mopping up the fallout from another poorly performing IPO. SoftBank put $7.7 billion into Uber, whose market value promptly fell after shares listed publicly at $45 in May. That price has since fallen to about $35, well below the price SoftBank paid for part of its stake. Some staffers at the Vision Fund are now concerned that WeWork’s valuation could fall further, to even below $20 billion—the valuation of SoftBank’s original investment made by the Vision Fund, according to people familiar with the company who asked not to be identified discussing private matters. Because the Vision Fund is so exposed to WeWork, it will play a substantial role in compensation for employees of the fund. People at the Vision Fund are not paid on a deal-by-deal basis, as with some other venture firms. Vision Fund employees, including high-profile bankers and investors, receive base salaries and bonuses, but only get payouts when profits are booked. They are also on the hook for potential losses, facing clawbacks of 20% and above for some senior staff, and 7% for more junior employees. There is also a possibility that WeWork could delay its IPO. Adam Neumann, WeWork’s larger-than-life chief executive officer and co-founder, pledged to SoftBank CEO Masayoshi Son earlier this year that WeWork will have a valuation of no lower than $47 billion when it goes public, people familiar with the matter said. A SoftBank spokeswoman declined to comment for this story. Neumann also met with Son in Tokyo last week to discuss a potential capital infusion, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing unidentified people familiar with the matter. The possibility of SoftBank investing money to enable WeWork to delay the IPO until 2020 was also raised in the discussions, the paper said.SoftBank’s massive bet in WeWork is emblematic of Son’s overall approach. “Why don’t we go big bang?” he told Bloomberg in an interview last year when asked about his investing style, and added that other venture capitalists tend to think too small. His goal of swaying the course of history by backing potentially world-changing companies requires that those companies make large outlays in areas from customer acquisition to hiring talent to research and development, a spending tactic that he acknowledged sometimes brings him into conflict with other investors.“The other shareholders, they try to create clean, polished little companies,” Son said. “And I say: ‘Let’s go rough. We don’t need to polish. We don’t need efficiency right now. Let’s make a big fight. Let’s make a big, successful—a big win.’”Sometimes, though, the other investors he comes in conflict with are his own. The Vision Fund’s backers, particularly Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund and Abu Dhabi's Mubadala Investment Co., scuttled a $16 billion investment early this year in WeWork that Son had championed, something Son alluded to in an interview with CNBC in March. SoftBank ended up making only a $2 billion investment separately from the Vision Fund.SoftBank’s huge bet on WeWork has also caused friction between members of the Tokyo company itself. While Son has the final say on investments, WeWork is seen internally as the bet of Ron Fisher, the Boston-based SoftBank executive and a longtime aide to Son, the people said. Fisher, who grew up in South Africa, was SoftBank’s highest-paid executive with $31 million in compensation in the last fiscal year, 62% more than a year earlier. Before SoftBank first invested in WeWork in 2017, Fisher met with executives at IWG Plc, a European competitor with a much lower valuation and—at the time—10 times as many sites, people with direct knowledge of the matter said. Some Vision Fund employees were surprised when instead of convincing Fisher not to invest in WeWork, the unfavorable metrics seemed to encourage him, leaving him convinced that tremendous growth lay ahead for the fledgling company. Son agreed. A month later, the Vision Fund led a $4.4 billion investment round into WeWork at a $20 billion valuation. Fisher and Mark Schwartz, the former Asia Pacific chairman at Goldman Sachs Group Inc. who was appointed to SoftBank’s board that year, joined WeWork’s board. WeWork, by far the largest in the grouping of SoftBank's real estate investments, serves as the linchpin of Son’s broader strategy around real estate. In all the sectors where SoftBank makes big bets, including financial services, transportation, health, and others, it believes that too many small companies with outdated technology drag down the industry, creating opportunities for bigger, updated iterations. SoftBank has also backed startups like brokerage-services provider Compass, mortgage lender Social Finance Inc. and construction-tech firm Katerra Inc., with the belief that these companies could funnel business to each other and boost growth in the sector overall.But Fisher and Son’s plans weren’t wholeheartedly shared by investors in the Vision Fund. That’s part of the reason that SoftBank’s WeWork stake is split between SoftBank itself and its giant tech fund. Of SoftBank’s 114 million WeWork shares, about 64 million are owned by the Vision Fund, and the rest by SoftBank Group, according to financial filings. Once SoftBank completes a contract that will result in it buying more shares next year, SoftBank Group’s stake will increase to roughly the same as the Vision Fund’s, the filings said. A spokeswoman for SoftBank declined to comment on the reasons behind splitting the stake.In its results for the quarter ended in June, SoftBank said the Vision Fund’s fair value was $82.2 billion. The cost of the investments in the most recent results was $66.3 billion, up from $60.1 billion the prior quarter, and the fair value doesn’t reflect the Vision Fund’s handful of exited investments such as the 146.68 billion yen the Vision Fund made when it sold its stake in the Indian retailer Flipkart to Walmart last year. For the most part, the fair value includes the portfolio companies that have held IPOs, because the Vision Fund typically holds onto most of its shares rather than selling them in the IPO, as was the case with Uber. That means as the price of those listed shares declines, the drop will hit the Vision Fund’s fair value in the next reported results. The Vision Fund will be able to book some increases due to successes like Guardant Health, a portfolio company that listed last year with a steadily rising stock price, but that still falls far short of offsetting the expected declines in other holdings. Similarly, any decline in that valuation at WeWork’s listing will hit the Vision Fund’s fair value. Son, a famously long-term thinker who has outlined 30- and 300-year plans for humanity, could conceivably brush off a poor showing for WeWork as a bump along the long road toward changing the world. It's not clear the Vision Fund will be able to do the same.To contact the authors of this story: Giles Turner in London at email@example.comSarah McBride in San Francisco at firstname.lastname@example.orgTo contact the editor responsible for this story: Anne VanderMey at email@example.com, Mark MilianTom GilesFor more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com©2019 Bloomberg L.P.
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- How to make sense of the whopping $47 billion in lease liabilities that WeWork disclosed ahead of its planned IPO?That figure makes WeWork one of the world’s largest lessees, according to Bloomberg data, which is pretty astonishing considering the flexible office space provider was founded less than a decade ago, bleeds cash, and doesn’t plan to become profitable any time soon.There is, however, a more charitable way to look at that eye-watering bill for future rent: These liabilities will sit on WeWork’s balance sheet so they don’t have to appear on yours. Until recently, so-called operating leases didn’t have to be included on corporate balance sheets but were tucked away in the footnotes to the financial statements, where they languished unread by most people.That always seemed like a glaring oversight as these commitments can be massive – in total, the world’s publicly traded companies have almost $3 trillion in operating lease obligations, according to Bloomberg data.(1)Plus, paying up isn’t optional – a bit like with money owed to a bank or bondholder. Hence ratings companies and securities analysts have always taken these obligations into consideration when assessing the riskiness of a business.The accounting rules have now caught up, and companies are now having to start adding the liabilities and a corresponding asset (reflecting the right to use the property) to their balance sheets.(2)There’s one big exception, though: The new rules still permit leases shorter than one year to remain off the balance sheet. For WeWork and rival IWG Plc, this is potentially a big selling point when talking to clients, albeit one that exploits a loophole in accounting rules.Lately, both companies have been talked up the potential boost to demand for short-term leases triggered by the change. IWG’s annual report notes that the new accounting standard is “already driving significant increases in demand for our services from enterprises.”It’s an open question whether an accounting rule change will really provide such a big fillip for these businesses: Auditors are likely to scrutinize short-term lease arrangements more deeply if there’s a likelihood they will be renewed. WeWork also is increasingly targeting large corporate clients that tend to require longer leases than a one-person start-up.And the downside for both these companies is that they have to take the accounting hit themselves. IWG has been forced to include a 5.5 billion-pound ($6.7 billion) discounted lease liability on its balance sheet, which has boosted its net debt and leverage ratios. Under the old accounting rules, it could claim net debt was about equal to Ebitda. Now it’s four times that amount. (3)Of course, IWG has been at pains to stress that the rule change won’t impact its cash flow – the lease payments remain the same.But anyone weighing whether to buy shares in WeWork’s IPO cannot ignore the fact that the company will have to find $47 billion from somewhere in coming years to meet its contractual obligations – including about $10 billion in just the next five years. Right now, its own very negative cash flows won’t cut it.(1) This refers to companies with a market cap of more than $100 million.(2) The relevant accounting rule changes are IFRS 16 and ASC 842 for companies that use GAAP. They differ in some respects but both have exclusions for leases shorter than one year.(3) WeWork's balance sheet as of June 30 2019 includes around $18 billion of long term operating lease obligations. WeWork arrived at that seemingly low figure by using a high discount rate of 8.2%.To contact the author of this story: Chris Bryant at firstname.lastname@example.orgTo contact the editor responsible for this story: Edward Evans at email@example.comThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Chris Bryant is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering industrial companies. He previously worked for the Financial Times.For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion©2019 Bloomberg L.P.