|Bid||22.51 x 1000|
|Ask||22.52 x 800|
|Day's Range||22.44 - 22.86|
|52 Week Range||17.68 - 25.83|
|Beta (3Y Monthly)||1.30|
|PE Ratio (TTM)||10.58|
|Earnings Date||Oct 30, 2019|
|Forward Dividend & Yield||1.44 (6.35%)|
|1y Target Est||20.56|
Andrew Formica is jubilant. Half a year into his new job as chief executive of Jupiter Asset Management, he has already started to make his mark on the FTSE 250 group, despite some setbacks. But the sports-mad ...
Janus Henderson Group plc will announce its third quarter 2019 results on Wednesday 30 October 2019 at 4am EDT, 8am GMT, 7pm AEDT. A conference call and webcast to discuss the results will be held at 8am EDT, 12pm GMT, 11pm AEDT.
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- The merger that created Standard Life Aberdeen Plc two years ago was designed to produce an asset manager big enough to survive the existential threats facing the fund management industry. Martin Gilbert, founder of the Aberdeen side of the equation, hoped to join what he called “that $1 trillion club” by growing assets under management. The reality has been somewhat different.Standard Life Aberdeen’s current market value of 6.7 billion pounds ($8.2 billion) is about half of what it was in August 2017 when the merger was completed. Back then, the company oversaw 670 billion pounds. Outflows in every quarter since have reduced that to 577.5 billion pounds – leaving it about 30% short of the magical figure cited by Gilbert.So Wednesday’s announcement that he’s leaving the firm after more than three decades marks something of a failure for the dealmaker. Starting with what he says was “three people in one office in Aberdeen,” Gilbert brokered more than 40 deals during his career, with his fund management company qualifying for inclusion in the benchmark FTSE 100 index in 2012.His departure was perhaps inevitable after Standard Life Aberdeen made Keith Skeoch sole chief executive officer in March, abandoning the dual-CEO roles around since the merger and demoting Gilbert to vice chairman. But it must still sting.The merger was supposed to herald a wave of tie-ups in the industry as fellow mid-sized asset managers recognized the benefits of scale and sought to strengthen themselves through alliances. Apart from the creation of Janus Henderson Group Plc, though, big M&A deals have proven illusory. And even the architect of that transaction seems to have had second thoughts. “Big isn’t necessarily better,” Andrew Formica, who engineered the 2017 merger of Henderson with Janus Capital, said in August from his new position as CEO of the much smaller Jupiter Fund Management Plc.It’s impossible to verify or falsify Skeoch’s oft-repeated claim that his company is still better off than the two standalone companies would have been. But it’s fair to say that the perceived failure of the industry’s two big mergers to deliver value for shareholders has deterred others from seeking similar transactions.For his part, Gilbert says he’s “looking forward to fresh challenges in the next stage of my career.” The 64-year-old looks set to join U.K. fintech startup Revolut Ltd. Two years on, though, the biggest deal of his career looks more like a warning of the dangers of overconfidence than a roadmap for the asset management industry.To contact the author of this story: Mark Gilbert at firstname.lastname@example.orgTo contact the editor responsible for this story: Melissa Pozsgay at email@example.comThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Mark Gilbert is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering asset management. He previously was the London bureau chief for Bloomberg News. He is also the author of "Complicit: How Greed and Collusion Made the Credit Crisis Unstoppable."For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion©2019 Bloomberg L.P.
Second-quarter global dividends hit a new record, but the rate of growth slowed to 1.1%. Dividends were hurt by a strong U.S. dollar, as many currencies fell against the greenback.
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- In October 2016, Henderson Chief Executive Officer Andrew Formica was busy merging his firm with Janus Capital in a bid to join the fund management industry’s $1 trillion club.“Others will say they wish they’d done it,” he said. Fast forward to his current job running the much smaller Jupiter Fund Management Plc. “Big isn’t necessarily better,” he now says.The mergers that produced Janus Henderson Group Plc and Standard Life Aberdeen Plc were supposed to usher in a wave of consolidation in the European fund management industry. That hasn’t happened – and the dismal performance of the two companies since is proving to be a deterrent to any peers thinking of expanding through acquisition.On Wednesday, SLA reported that customers pulled 15.9 billion pounds ($19.4 billion) out of its funds, more than the 13.4 billion pounds analysts had expected.While rising markets boosted performance to drive assets under management up to 577.5 billion pounds by the middle of the year, they are still 5% below their level at the end of 2017. Scale, it seems, isn’t sufficient to attract customer flows.Last week, Janus Henderson reported its seventh consecutive quarter of withdrawals. Assets under management fell to $359.8 billion by mid-year, down from $370.1 billion a year earlier.Those outflows come as performance has suffered. By the end of June, just 66% of the firm’s funds had outperformed their benchmarks in the previous year, compared with 72% on a three-year basis and 80% over five years.It seems fair to speculate that the distraction of combining two firms has taken a toll on the portfolio managers. Melding two different cultures is never easy. That may well explain the reluctance of rivals to merge.For sure, Jupiter’s Formica is cutting his cloth according to his new situation. In his current berth he oversees about $56 billion. But it’s not just the smaller asset management firms that have been put off by the less than stellar experience of Europe’s two biggest fund mergers.Asoka Woehrmann, CEO of DWS Group GmbH, was asked on an earnings conference call a few weeks ago about his firm’s ambitions to become a top 10 player in the industry. “How many mergers happened in this industry and after three years, you are sitting asking the reason why?” he replied. “This is exactly what we are going to avoid.”With about $805 billion of assets, Woehrmann acknowledged that it would take a “transformational deal” for DWS to get into the top tier, where firms need at least $1.3 trillion of assets. But he stressed the need for patience. “To be big is not our main target,” he said. “Increasing shareholder value is the most relevant target.”That certainly hasn’t been the experience of the owners of SLA stock.Mergers may still happen. Deutsche Bank AG, which owns about 80% of DWS, still seems keen to find a partner for the asset manager. UBS Group AG is similarly anxious to do a deal with its funds arm. And now that GAM Holding AG has drawn a line under its troubles, a suitor may be tempted to bid for it.But in fund management, the firm’s most valuable assets walk out of the door every evening. SLA and Janus Henderson are stark reminders of the difficulties that the industry still faces – and that mergers are no panacea.(Corrects spelling of Janus in first paragraph.)To contact the author of this story: Mark Gilbert at firstname.lastname@example.orgTo contact the editor responsible for this story: Edward Evans at email@example.comThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Mark Gilbert is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering asset management. He previously was the London bureau chief for Bloomberg News. He is also the author of "Complicit: How Greed and Collusion Made the Credit Crisis Unstoppable."For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion©2019 Bloomberg L.P.
With investors focused on organic growth and profitability when assessing the U.S.-based asset managers, we've seen a bifurcation in the group during the past year between the perceived haves (those capable of generating organic growth and maintaining margins) and the have-nots (those that are expected to struggle to do both or that have fallen into a pattern of poorer performance and positioning). While some of the 12 U.S.-based asset managers we cover are currently trading at multiples not seen since the 2008-09 financial crisis, we recommend that long-term investors focus on quality over price by sticking with the only remaining wide-moat firms in our coverage: BlackRock BLK and T. Rowe Price TROW . Wide-moat BlackRock BLK closed the second quarter with a record $6.842 trillion in managed assets, up 5.0% sequentially and 8.6% year over year, with positive flows, foreign-exchange gains, and market gains all contributing to assets under management.
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- Amundi SA, Europe’s biggest independent fund manager, saw customers withdraw money for a third consecutive quarter in the three months through June. It’s far from the only asset manager suffering outflows. And as the drumbeat of reports and research questioning portfolio managers’ claims to beat the market grows ever louder, the reluctance of clients to commit funds is completely rational.Halfway through the 36 pages of slides Amundi published along with its results on Wednesday is a data set entitled “Solid Performances.” There is another – less Panglossian – way of reading the numbers. One of the slides purports to argue that 64% of the firm’s fixed income assets and 59% of its equity holdings outperformed their relevant benchmarks in the first half of this year. I’d argue that customers should read those figures the other way around; that more than a third of Amundi’s bond bets and almost half of its stock picks fared no better than their respective indexes.Similar skepticism is justified with respect to how Amundi’s performance ranks against that of its peers. On a five-year basis, for example, the firm highlights that 75% of its funds ranked in the top two quartiles for performance as measured by research firm Morningstar. Or, alternatively, the figures show that a quarter of its funds languished in the bottom half – hardly a terrible performance, but still suggesting a one-in-four chance that you’d have been better off buying an index tracker.On a shorter timescale, its performance has become even less impressive, depending how you look at it. On a one-year horizon, almost a third of Amundi’s funds were in the bottom two quartiles.And all of these figures are calculated before fees. Having a 69% chance of beating the benchmark over the course of a year, depending which Amundi fund you chose, doesn’t seem like disastrous odds – until you include those fees, which erode your returns.None of this is to single out Amundi for criticism. The entire fund management industry uses similar marketing methods, and arguably the French firm’s five-year performance is still impressive. But it is far from the only asset manager to suffer outflows. Janus Henderson Group Plc said on Wednesday that it suffered a seventh consecutive quarter of withdrawals in the second quarter, while Man Group Plc, the world’s biggest publicly traded hedge fund, saw net outflows of $1.1 billion in the first half of this year.The European asset management industry in general has seen “virtually zero net inflows” so far this year “given the persistent wait-and-see approach from savers and investors resulting from strong risk aversion,” Amundi says.I’d add a caveat to that. As more customers question the value that active managers claim to be able to add to investment strategies, the industry faces an existential crisis. Even if surging markets restore investor faith in the outlook, low-cost index-tracking funds will capture more of their money.At least Amundi has a hedge against that trend; its passive business attracted almost 7 billion euros ($7.8 billion) of assets in the first half of the year, growing assets under management in exchange-traded and smart beta funds to 114 billion euros. For fund managers that don’t offer those products, the future looks increasingly bleak.To contact the author of this story: Mark Gilbert at firstname.lastname@example.orgTo contact the editor responsible for this story: Edward Evans at email@example.comThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Mark Gilbert is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering asset management. He previously was the London bureau chief for Bloomberg News. He is also the author of "Complicit: How Greed and Collusion Made the Credit Crisis Unstoppable."For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion©2019 Bloomberg L.P.
Moody's Investors Service ("Moody's") has completed a periodic review of the ratings of Janus Henderson Group Plc and other ratings that are associated with the same analytical unit. The review was conducted through a portfolio review in which Moody's reassessed the appropriateness of the ratings in the context of the relevant principal methodology(ies), recent developments, and a comparison of the financial and operating profile to similarly rated peers. This publication does not announce a credit rating action and is not an indication of whether or not a credit rating action is likely in the near future.
Janus Henderson (JHG) doesn't possess the right combination of the two key ingredients for a likely earnings beat in its upcoming report. Get prepared with the key expectations.
Moody's Investors Service has affirmed Janus Henderson Group Plc ("Janus Henderson")'s Baa2 issuer rating and changed its outlook to stable from positive. Moody's changed Janus Henderson's outlook to stable from positive as expectations that the merged group would re-establish positive flows and organic growth have not materialised.
Global dividends shrugged off concerns about the world economy, rising 7.8% on a headline basis in the first quarter, and reaching a first-quarter record of US$263.3bn, according to the latest Janus Henderson Global Dividend Index.