|Bid||0.00 x 0|
|Ask||0.00 x 0|
|Day's Range||40.76 - 40.76|
|52 Week Range||37.48 - 71.80|
|Beta (3Y Monthly)||0.89|
|PE Ratio (TTM)||6.59|
|Forward Dividend & Yield||8.76 (21.50%)|
|1y Target Est||N/A|
(Bloomberg) -- Credit Agricole SA and Natixis SA are among French lenders nursing losses on loans made to Rallye SA and other parent companies of retailing giant Casino Guichard-Perrachon SA, which are creaking under more than 3 billion euros ($3.3 billion) of debt.Natixis made a provision for credit losses of 110 million euros in the second quarter because of its loans to Rallye, which filed for creditor protection in May, according to a person familiar with the matter. Credit Agricole added 69 million euros to cover soured debts at the division that houses corporate and investment banking mostly because of the exposure to the same company, according to a separate person. The people asked not to be named because the matter is private.Representatives for the lenders declined to comment.This is the first tangible impact of Casino group’s troubles on its lenders. For years, banks have been lending to the holding companies of Casino, allowing founder Jean-Charles Naouri to keep control of the business. The retailer’s struggles against new market entrants and a mistimed expansion in South America weighed on its profitability and ability to repay the debt, eventually forcing the holding units to file for creditor protection.Rallye, the largest of these firms, had 1.8 billion euros of bank loans outstanding at the end of June, of which 210 million euros are unsecured.Casino also told investors last month Rallye and other parent companies have an additional 323 million euros of structured financing arrangements secured by share pledges. Societe Generale SA won a court ruling in Paris last month that allows it to call on the pledge even if Rallye is under creditor protection.Societe Generale’s net cost of risk rose to 314 million euros in the second quarter because of a number of troubled corporate loans, including those to Rallye, a separate person familiar said.A spokesman for the bank said that the company’s cost of risk stayed at a low level, with a limited impact stemming from a few specific situations. He declined to comment on individual clients.\--With assistance from Luca Casiraghi.To contact the reporters on this story: Donal Griffin in London at email@example.com;Gaspard Sebag in Paris at firstname.lastname@example.org;Lucca de Paoli in London at email@example.comTo contact the editors responsible for this story: Ambereen Choudhury at firstname.lastname@example.org, Sara Marley, James AmottFor more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com©2019 Bloomberg L.P.
Rating Action: Moody's assigns definitive ratings to Italian consumer loan ABS Notes issued by Brignole CO 2019-1 S.r.l. Global Credit Research- 01 Aug 2019. London, 01 August 2019-- Moody's Investors ...
NEW YORK , July 31, 2019 /PRNewswire/ -- ARCO 3 SpA ("ARCO") and Natixis have successfully closed senior facilities totaling US$69.1 million for the up-to-70MW portfolio of solar PV plants in ...
The potential deal would allow Natixis, owned by French cooperative lender BPCE, to cash out on its remaining 42 percent stake in Coface following an initial public offering of the company in 2014. The deal talks between Apollo and Coface are at an early stage, and there is no certainty they will result in an agreement, the sources said, asking not to be identified because the matter is confidential. Coface did not immediately respond to a request for comment, while Apollo declined to comment.
Moody's has not assigned ratings to GBP 24.36M Class E Floating Rate Asset-Backed Notes, GBP 11.59M Class X Floating Rate Asset-Backed Notes and GBP 11.59M Class Z Variable Rate Asset-Backed Notes which are also issued by the Issuer. SBOLT 2019-2 is a securitization backed by a static pool of small business loans originated through Funding Circle Ltd's ("Funding Circle") online lending platform and is the fourth transaction of its series.
Rating Action: Moody's assigns provisional ratings to Italian consumer loan ABS Notes to be issued by Brignole CO 2019-1 S.r.l. Moody's has not assigned any ratings to the EUR [ ] Class F Asset Backed Floating Rate Notes due July 2034.
Rating Action: Moody's assigns definitive ratings to RMBS Notes issued by Polaris 2019-1 plc. Global Credit Research- 02 Jul 2019. GBP 262.4 million RMBS Notes rated, relating to a portfolio of UK residential ...
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- With the explosions that have rattled Natixis SA’s H2O Asset Management and Neil Woodford’s flagship fund dominating the headlines in recent weeks and months, it’s worth noting that the environment for the European fund management industry as a whole is actually not as bad as those idiosyncratic blow-ups might suggest.The share prices of the region’s biggest asset managers have bounced back from the trashing they underwent last year. That’s partly because of lingering expectations that the sector is overdue for a bout of mergers and acquisitions. But it also reflects the likelihood that clients have been putting money to work, reversing the outflows that the industry suffered last year.Amundi SA reckons that $100 billion was withdrawn from European mutual funds in the final three months of 2018. Figures just released by the European Fund and Asset Management Association and the Investment Company Institute show investment fund assets in the region grew by 6.8% in the first quarter compared to the fourth, rising to 15.77 trillion euros ($18 trillion).Equity gains are clearly helping to tempt investors back into the markets. The Stoxx Europe 600 Index is up by more than 13% this year, putting it on track to deliver its best first-half gain since 1998, according to figures compiled by my Bloomberg News colleague Namitha Jagadeesh:And in fixed income markets, expectations that the Federal Reserve will lead the way in prompting central banks to ease monetary policy anew have helped goose bond market returns around the world:Challenges for the industry persist. The concerns about illiquid holdings, that have prompted investors to withdraw billions of euros and pounds from portfolios managed by H20 and Woodford, look set to spark a new bout of oversight and rules from the regulators. And those two episodes will only accelerate the shift into low-cost index tracking funds, to the ongoing detriment of active managers.But for now, life is about as good as it’s going to get for European funds. The bad news? It’s likely to delay – yet again – the much-need and long-anticipated consolidation that the industry still sorely needs.To contact the author of this story: Mark Gilbert at email@example.comTo contact the editor responsible for this story: Jennifer Ryan at firstname.lastname@example.orgThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Mark Gilbert is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering asset management. He previously was the London bureau chief for Bloomberg News. He is also the author of "Complicit: How Greed and Collusion Made the Credit Crisis Unstoppable."For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion©2019 Bloomberg L.P.
Rating Action: Moody's assigns provisional ratings to four classes of SME Notes to be issued by Small Business Origination Loan Trust 2019-2 DAC. Global Credit Research- 25 Jun 2019. GBP million of securities ...
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- Enter the phrase “reach for yield” into Google, and the search engine will return 335,000 results in less than a second. So no-one should be blindsided by the revelation that investment managers have been tempted to boost returns by buying riskier securities in recent years. Regulators should still be asking hard questions right now of the portfolio managers they oversee.H2O Asset Management, a unit of French bank Natixis SA, is seeing billions of euros head for the door after the Financial Times reported last week that the fund had bought a bunch of bonds linked to entrepreneur Lars Windhorst.While the firm was transparent in reporting the securities it held, it took the FT to trace the threads between an Italian lingerie maker and a German real estate company and link them back to Windhorst. To investors, it looks like H2O loaned a large sum of money to the entrepreneur, dressing its actions up as a series of uncorrelated investments in private bonds sold by a diverse range of companies.Announcing a package of measures intended to stem the withdrawals, Natixis said on Monday that the fund had switched to “record these securities at their transactional value in case of an immediate total sale, rather than recording them at their standard market value.”I have no idea what the alleged standard market value for such illiquid securities would be and, I would suggest, neither does H20, no matter how hard it worked its spreadsheet to perform whatever cashflow analysis it could on Windhorst’s companies. But after “valuations obtained this Sunday from international banks,” H2O has revalued its holdings.H2O isn’t saying what the new, lower “transactional” valuations are. But the drop in the bonds’ aggregate weighting in the funds to less than 2% of assets under management, down from as much as 9.7% less than a week ago, gives some flavor of the discounts being applied.The move suggests Bruno Crastes, H2O’s co-founder and chief executive officer, is considerably less ebullient about those unlisted investments than he was in a video posted by the H24 Finance news service on Friday. In the English transcript of that interview supplied by H2O’s public relations firm, Crastes says that “obviously there is no reason for us to not continue in the future to invest in those private bonds.”That didn’t stop his firm from selling about 300 million euros ($342 million) of the private placements at the end of last week, according to my colleagues at Bloomberg News. Presumably the price those sales fetched is closer to the values produced by Sunday’s ringing around, rather than the market values ascribed to the bonds a week ago. But there’s a wider issue here than one fund manager juicing its returns. The reach for yield referred to at the start of this article is likely to have become even more desperate in recent years – and financial regulators need to be on their toes to safeguard the public from portfolio managers playing fast and loose with what counts as a liquid investment.Some $13 trillion of what we still laughingly refer to as the fixed-income market currently generates negative yields, meaning the only fixed aspect of the securities is that buyers end up paying for the privilege of stashing their cash in bonds:Even the $2.4 trillion global market for high-yield bonds is undergoing something of an identity crisis as non-investment grade debt offers less than two-thirds of the average yield investors have enjoyed in the past twenty years:With yields on government bonds at record lows in several countries, the temptation to roll down the credit curve into lower- or even non-rated fixed-income securities becomes harder to resist. And the risk of investors getting spooked and all heading for the exit at once has been shown to be a clear and present danger by the recent exoduses endured by H20, Neil Woodford and Swiss asset manager GAM Holding AG.Financial markets are built on several different types of origami. They range from the relatively simple maturity transformation of borrowing short-term money and lending it for a longer period, to more complex engineering such as collateralized debt obligations that slice securities into different risk buckets.Liquidity transformation, though, arguably poses the biggest risk to investors, since it can lead to their hard-earned capital being trapped in investments that turn out to be far harder to sell than the marketing brochures might have you believe. Here’s where the shoe has pinched three times in the past year; so liquidity, or rather the lack thereof, is exactly where regulators should be focusing their attention, to unearth any landmines before stretched valuations in the credit market cause the next financial crisis.To contact the author of this story: Mark Gilbert at email@example.comTo contact the editor responsible for this story: Edward Evans at firstname.lastname@example.orgThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Mark Gilbert is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering asset management. He previously was the London bureau chief for Bloomberg News. He is also the author of "Complicit: How Greed and Collusion Made the Credit Crisis Unstoppable."For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion©2019 Bloomberg L.P.
Rating Action: Moody's withdraws the ratings of Russia's Natixis Bank JSC. Global Credit Research- 24 Jun 2019. London, 24 June 2019-- Moody's Investors Service has today withdrawn the following ratings ...
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- Ruchir Sharma, chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley Investment Management, wrote a provocative op-ed in the New York Times last weekend. Titled “When Dead Companies Don’t Die,” it argues that unprecedented monetary stimulus from global central banks created a “fat and slow” world, dominated by large companies and plagued by a swarm of “zombie firms” — those that should be out of business but survive because of rock-bottom borrowing costs.I would add that central bankers are creating a horde of zombie investors as well.By now, bond markets have adjusted to the unabashedly dovish shift from European Central Bank President Mario Draghi and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell. In the U.S., benchmark 10-year Treasury yields fell below 2% for the first time since Donald Trump was elected president, and some Wall Street strategists expect it’ll reach a record low around this time in 2020. Across the Atlantic, 10-year German bund yields plumbed new lows of negative 0.33%, French 10-year yields hit zero for the first time, and the entire yield curve in Denmark was on the cusp of turning negative.With any sort of risk-free yield largely zapped worldwide on the prospect of further monetary easing, is it any surprise what happened next? Investors turned to the tried-and-true playbook of grabbing anything risky. No matter that the global recovery has lasted nearly a decade, trade concerns abound and central banks see economic weakness — the S&P 500 Index promptly rose to a record high as investors mindlessly plowed in. And in a more specific example highlighted by my Bloomberg Opinion colleagues Marcus Ashworth and Elisa Martinuzzi, bond buyers were all-too-eager to snap up subordinated Greek bank debt from Piraeus Bank SA, which tapped European capital markets for the first time since the financial crisis. “The offer would have been unthinkable a year ago,” they wrote.Are these really the characteristics of healthy financial markets? It hardly seems ideal that individual investors, pensions and insurers are effectively forced into owning lower-rated bonds, equities or even alternative assets like timber to meet their return targets. In fact, that sounds like the textbook definition of a bubble. But as Sharma points out, permanently easy policy aims to create an environment in which those bubbles can’t pop.“Government stimulus programs were conceived as a way to revive economies in recession, not to keep growth alive indefinitely. A world without recessions may sound like progress, but recessions can be like forest fires, purging the economy of dead brush so that new shoots can grow. Lately, the cycle of regeneration has been suspended, as governments douse the first flicker of a coming recession with buckets of easy money and new spending. Now experiments in permanent stimulus are sapping the process of creative destruction at the heart of any capitalist system and breeding oversize zombies faster than start-ups.To assume that central banks can hold the next recession at bay indefinitely represents a dangerous complacency.”Time and again, market watchers will warn that the credit cycle is on the verge of turning. “The future looks pretty bleak,” Bob Michele, JPMorgan Asset Management’s head of global fixed income, said this week as he advocated selling into high-yield rallies. “We have probably the riskiest credit market that we have ever had,” Scott Mather, chief investment officer of U.S. core strategies at Pacific Investment Management Co., said last month. Morningstar Inc. just suspended its rating on a fund owned by French bank Natixis SA because of concerns about the “liquidity and appropriateness” of some corporate bond holdings, adding to jitters about a broader liquidity mismatch in the money-management industry.It’s hard to take this fretting too seriously when central banks persistently come to the rescue. What’s more, in many ways it’s in the best interest of all involved not to get too worked up about those risks.U.S. households and nonprofits had a combined net worth of $109 trillion in the first quarter of 2019, a record, according to Fed data. Dig a bit deeper, and it’s clear that a surge in the value of their equity holdings plays a crucial role. They directly owned $17.5 trillion of stocks, which represents 110% of their disposable personal income. That ratio reached 120% in the third quarter of 2018, very nearly topping the all-time high of 121.2% set just before the dot-com crash. Add in “indirectly held” stocks, and individuals look as exposed to equities as ever. At $12.3 trillion, those holdings were worth 78.6% of DPI in the third quarter, compared with 69.5% at the dot-com peak.To put it more plainly, since the start of the economic recovery in mid-2009, their total assets have increased by almost 70%. Financial assets(1) have appreciated 76%. Stock holdings have soared by more than 140%.Effectively, the sharp rally in equities has turbocharged a resurgence in the overall wealth of Americans. The prospect of losing those gains is almost too painful to think about. Perhaps that’s why, as DoubleLine Capital’s Jeffrey Gundlach pointed out in January, investors were “panicking into stocks, not out of stocks” during the late-2018 sell-off. “People have been so programmed” to buy the dip, he said, that it reminded him a bit of how the financial crisis developed. Call investors programmed; call them zombies — it’s the same thing.The Fed, for its part, argues that it’s doing good by sustaining the expansion. Notably, Powell said the economic recovery is starting to reach segments of the U.S. population that had been largely left out thus far — communities that “haven’t had a bull market” and “haven’t had just a booming economy.” Overall, he said officials don’t see signals that the U.S. is at maximum employment. Morgan Stanley’s Sharma argues wage growth is sluggish because bigger companies have more power to suppress worker pay, given that they crowd out (or acquire) startups and other competition.There are no easy answers to these large-scale problems. That includes central banks simply lowering interest rates or purchasing more government bonds. Powell said as much, noting “we have the tools we have.” But at least he has some room to maneuver toward a soft landing. The ECB, which has pushed yields on some corporate bonds in the region below zero, and the Bank of Japan, which owns large swaths of local exchange-traded funds, have done virtually no tightening and may soon need to ease even further.The most troubling part of this heavy-handed approach among central banks is that it eliminates the option for investors to earn any sort of return above inflation on safe assets. This delicate balance seems as if it can only last as long as business and consumer sentiment allows. It has been more than a decade since the Fed last cut interest rates, and during that period, it paid handsomely to be a zombie investor throwing money at the S&P 500. With the next easing cycle upon us, much is riding on the status quo prevailing.(1) Aside from stocks, this includes deposits, direct-benefit promises, non-corporate businesses and other financial assets.To contact the author of this story: Brian Chappatta at email@example.comTo contact the editor responsible for this story: Daniel Niemi at firstname.lastname@example.orgThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Brian Chappatta is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering debt markets. He previously covered bonds for Bloomberg News. He is also a CFA charterholder.For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion©2019 Bloomberg L.P.
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- There’s never just one cockroach. That market truism, noted more than a decade ago by market strategist Dennis Gartman, has been useful in divining the aftershocks of everything from the credit crunch to the European debt crisis to the Volkswagen AG emissions cheating scandal. So it shouldn’t be a surprise that it also seems to apply to fund manager Neil Woodford and his misadventures in stocking his portfolio with illiquid investments.Shares in Natixis SA dropped to their lowest in three years after the Financial Times wrote that one of its investment funds, H2O asset management, had loaded up on hard-to-trade bonds of companies related to German entrepreneur Lars Windhorst. The article prompted Morningstar to suspend its rating on one of the funds managed by H2O, which oversaw almost $33 billion at the end of last year.Shareholders of Natixis may have overreacted, given that the fund unit accounts for only about 6 percent of the French bank’s net income, according to Jefferies analyst Maxence Le Gouvello du Timat. But Morningstar isn’t likely to hang around in dropping any other funds it deems to be at risk of trapping investors due to liquidity mismatches, especially given that it’s taken GAM Holding AG a year to unwind its absolute return bond funds after freezing them. The revelations about the scale of Woodford’s escapades prior to his move earlier this month to freeze redemptions from his flagship fund suggest that investors can’t rely on the regulator to safeguard their interests.In a letter published this week, the Financial Conduct Authority revealed that its “preliminary supervisory inquiries” suggest Woodford had about 20% of his Woodford Equity Income Fund in unlisted securities in February of this year. That’s astonishing.The maximum allowed for the fund was 10%. So Woodford didn’t just edge over the limit, he blasted through it. For every 100 pounds ($127) invested, 20 pounds was in illiquid investments, double the amount that investors in his fund would have expected.Moreover, the FCA said this was the third time the fund had exceeded its illiquidity limits, following breaches in February and March of last year that “were each notified to us as resolved within a timeframe we had agreed.” And yet, on all three occasions, investors were left in the dark."At no point would it have been appropriate for the FCA to notify any platform or investors of these breaches,” a spokesman for the regulator told the Telegraph earlier this week.Really? I can just about see how last year’s transgressions could be forgiven if they were inadvertent and swiftly resolved. But having twice as much of the fund in unlisted investments in February strikes me as an entirely appropriate time for the regulator to force it to come clean with the investors it owed a duty of care to, even if the FCA itself didn’t type the email or sign the letter advising them of the infringement.It’s still not clear how long the 3.8 billion pounds will remain frozen in Woodford’s fund, or indeed how much money investors will end up getting back. But now would be a good time for the trustees of every single fund they’re responsible for that offers daily withdrawals to ask some hard questions about just how easy it would be to buy and sell the securities in the portfolios if a flood of investors demanded their money back.To contact the author of this story: Mark Gilbert at email@example.comTo contact the editor responsible for this story: Jennifer Ryan at firstname.lastname@example.orgThis column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Mark Gilbert is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering asset management. He previously was the London bureau chief for Bloomberg News. He is also the author of "Complicit: How Greed and Collusion Made the Credit Crisis Unstoppable."For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinion©2019 Bloomberg L.P.