|Bid||42.25 x 0|
|Ask||42.25 x 0|
|Day's Range||41.30 - 42.95|
|52 Week Range||26.30 - 50.70|
|Beta (5Y Monthly)||N/A|
|PE Ratio (TTM)||N/A|
|Earnings Date||Nov 03, 2020 - Nov 07, 2020|
|Forward Dividend & Yield||N/A (N/A)|
|1y Target Est||73.58|
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- Another Indian bank has failed, the third collapse of a major deposit-taking institution in 15 months and the first since the onset of the coronavirus pandemic. But instead of allowing a zombie lender to linger after a half-baked rescue, the central bank has wisely decided to put Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. out of its misery. Better still, it’s called upon a foreign institution to take over the assets and liabilities. That should stoke interest of other global banks.The moth-eaten LVB will cease to exist, its equity completely wiped out. Only its deposits will appear on the books of the India unit of DBS Group Holdings Ltd., Singapore’s biggest bank. This is a much cleaner solution than how the Reserve Bank of India handled the implosion last September of Punjab & Maharashtra Co-operative Bank Ltd., whose loan book was basically tied to one bankrupt shantytown developer. The scam-tainted lender is trying to sell itself, though it’s unclear why anyone would touch it with a barge pole. More than a year later, larger PMC depositors still remain trapped, under orders from the RBI. The refusal to give a decent burial to a failed institution was visible in the messy bailout of Yes Bank Ltd. in March. Without wiping out the existing equity, authorities permanently wrote down $1.2 billion of Yes Bank’s liabilities, the first complete loss imposed by any country on Additional Tier 1 bondholders. They then leaned on government-controlled State Bank of India to inject some more capital. Once a major corporate lender, Yes was destroyed from within by its previous management’s dubious underwriting. Whether it has finally been saved may not be known before March 2022. Until then, Covid-19 has provided a convenient regulatory cover to delay recognizing stressed assets.LVB was struggling to survive even before the March lockdown. The resulting dislocation dragged down the Tier 1 capital ratio to minus 1.83%, putting the lender beyond redemption. By swallowing assets and liabilities of the 94-year-lender, DBS gets 563 branches, 974 ATMs and a $1.6 billion franchise in retail liabilities.The Singapore institution was the second foreign bank after SBM Group of Mauritius to turn its India operations into a wholly owned subsidiary. Yet, DBS Bank India Ltd. hasn’t really expanded outside major metropolises. LVB will help it penetrate deeper into the more industrialized southern state of Tamil Nadu, where Singapore’s ethnic Indian minority has an ancestral connection. Faster growth in the country could even open up the possibility of a stock-market listing in Mumbai for the India subsidiary, says Bloomberg Intelligence analyst Diksha Gera.The deal nixes speculation that the RBI might turn to the state-run Punjab National Bank to rescue LVB if it couldn’t find an acceptable rescuer on its own.(2) Punjab National, allegedly taken for a $2.1 billion fake loan-guarantee ride by an uncle-nephew jeweler duo, is hardly the picture of operational strength and financial vitality depositors want to see in a white knight.To that extent, the RBI’s decision to broaden the search beyond a “national team” is a good sign. It shows that the regulator wants control of banking assets to be in strong hands. If they incorporate locally, overseas institutions will be considered at (almost) par with homegrown ones. DBS’s rivals like Standard Chartered Plc, Citigroup Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc have deeper India ties and bigger branch networks. But their interest in establishing local subsidiaries never perked up because of the stipulation that 25% of new branches in any year should be in unbanked rural areas. However, now that DBS is getting to build scale in India’s capital-starved banking system via an amalgamation blessed by the regulator, there may be similar opportunities in store for others, particularly HSBC.The British bank needs to cut its excessive reliance on the Hong Kong market, where it’s caught in the middle of a financial cold war between China and the U.S. DBS Chief Executive Officer Piyush Gupta has put the balance sheet of the bank’s Indian unit to use and promised to bring in an extra $336 million in capital. Noel Quinn, his counterpart at HSBC, should take time off from his cost-cutting agenda and weigh the opportunity. LVB was just a small private-sector bank, but the Indian government also wants to consolidate its 12 state-run lenders into four. There could be an M&A prize for becoming Indian.(Updates with possibility of a stock-market listing in Mumbai, 5th paragraph.The 3rd paragraph in an earlier version was corrected to show Yes Bank bailout was this March. )(1) LVB tried to sell itself, unsuccessfully, to non-bank financiers.This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Andy Mukherjee is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering industrial companies and financial services. He previously was a columnist for Reuters Breakingviews. He has also worked for the Straits Times, ET NOW and Bloomberg News.For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinionSubscribe now to stay ahead with the most trusted business news source.©2020 Bloomberg L.P.
The release of a Netflix series on four Indian tycoons facing fraud allegations has been put on hold following a state court order, two sources said on Thursday, in the latest legal tussle faced by the U.S. streaming giant in a key market. The "Bad Boy Billionaires: India" documentary series about liquor tycoon Vijay Mallya, Subrata Roy of the Sahara group, founder and former head of Satyam Computer Services Ramalinga Raju and jeweller Nirav Modi was set for release this week.
(Bloomberg Opinion) -- Corporate chicanery appears in multiple forms and with unfailing regularity: think Enron Corp. or Wirecard AG. What bedevils capitalism in India is the propensity of some investors to cheat all other stakeholders.In good times, “promoters” — as controlling shareholders are known in local law — puff up project costs and award contracts to related parties, draining profits away from the company. The extraordinary effort that entrepreneurs put in to beat the country’s legendary red tape provides, at least in some minds, a justification for helping themselves to an outsize share of the spoils. A highly opaque system of election financing gives politicians a stake in perpetuating the status quo. In bad times, promoters leave creditors with hardly any value to extract from failed businesses. The biggest victim is a state-dominated banking system that recoups very little from insolvent companies. To give government-backed lenders visibility on whether their funds are being siphoned off, the central bank recently took a drastic step. Any company with 500 million rupees ($6.7 million) or more in debt will have to open a dedicated account at a bank exposed to at least 10% of its borrowings to pay creditors. Only the lender operating this escrow account can handle the firm’s day-to-day banking business. Since public-sector banks do the bulk of corporate lending, they stand to gain current accounts. Existing banking relationships will need to be consolidated within three months. This is bound to upset the likes of Citigroup Inc., HSBC Holdings Plc and Standard Chartered Plc. These global-local, or “glocal,” banks have been beefing up their cash management platforms — and integrating them with their customers’ computer systems. The more they help businesses save money across cross-border supply chains and earn smart returns on idle balances, the bigger the current-account pile that gravitates toward them.Citigroup alone has $900 billion-plus of such deposits worldwide. This is free funding, which takes banks years of investments in technology and customer relationships to acquire. To be asked to cede this advantage in an important market is unfair. Take Citi again. With the exception of State Bank of India, the biggest Indian lender, no government-controlled institution enjoys a deeper penetration when it comes to acting as the lead cash management bank for India’s largest companies.The U.S. bank isn’t alone. The U.K.’s StanChart is also competitive in signing up top companies. HSBC and Singapore’s DBS Group Holdings Ltd. are the other two foreign banks with significant cash management businesses.“The dislocation over the next few months can be unsettling for both the glocal banks and their cash-management customers,” says Gaurav Arora, Greenwich Associates’ head of Asia-Pacific. If the Reserve Bank of India’s move smacks of being an act of desperation, that’s because it probably is. India’s labor-surplus economy can’t afford to keep hemorrhaging precious financial capital to promoters’ private-bank accounts in Singapore or Switzerland. And yet such is the political power of large debtors that every legal tool given to creditors has tended to become blunt over time. The 2016 bankruptcy act, the latest and most promising in the series, saw recovery rates of just 12% in the December quarter. Worse still, after the coronavirus outbreak, insolvency courts have been shut for a year to new cases. The pandemic has also brought back loan restructuring, where banks can extend repayment tenures and pretend that accounts are standard and don’t need additional provisions. This, as Fitch Ratings notes, is a reprisal of India’s strategy between 2010 and 2016. Back then, extend-and-pretend exacerbated what would eventually become a $200 billion-plus stressed asset problem.The big idea behind the current-account regulation seems to be this: If taxpayer-funded banks can’t hope to recover much from dead companies, they should at least be able to monitor how living ones use their money. However, just because bankers can see more transactions doesn’t mean they will. Punjab National Bank lost nearly $2 billion in a scandal involving an uncle-nephew jeweler duo by running up international liabilities over the Swift messaging network — and not reconciling them with its core banking software. The scam went on for seven years. Since then, PNB claims to have been swindled three more times.India’s banks need long-pending governance reforms. To thwart bad behavior, the RBI needs more muscular supervision. Hijacking customers of Citi or StanChart and redistributing them among those who don’t necessarily have the best expertise is socialist overkill. It will also prove useless. Errant company bosses will be one step ahead, as they’ve always been. This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.Andy Mukherjee is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering industrial companies and financial services. He previously was a columnist for Reuters Breakingviews. He has also worked for the Straits Times, ET NOW and Bloomberg News.For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com/opinionSubscribe now to stay ahead with the most trusted business news source.©2020 Bloomberg L.P.